Exam 96: Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer's view on aiding the poor and hungry is

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -According to Singer, we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world regardless of

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -A common criticism of Singer's view is that it overlooks duties that we have to

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer thinks we have a greater obligation to give to the needy nearby than to those far away.

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer's less stringent principle says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Some 80 percent of the world's wealth belongs to

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer suggests that we should give 100 percent of our wealth to the poor and hungry.

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -A criticism of Singer's view is that the strong principle

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -If we adhered stringently to Singer's principles, our lifestyles would be transformed.

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer contends that if we have the power to prevent a very bad thing from occurring and if we can prevent it without "sacrificing anything morally significant," then

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer's strong principle requires us to give aid to the level of

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer believes that giving to the poor can violate their need for independence.

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -According to Singer, giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity but

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer believes that giving to the poor can violate their autonomy.

Peter Singer advocates a fundamental shift in the attitudes of people in affluent countries toward the poor and starving of the Third World. His argument is that (i) suffering and death from lack of food and other necessities are bad; (ii) "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening" without excessive sacrifice, we have a moral duty to do it; therefore, (iii) we have a moral duty to help the poor and starving of the world (regardless of their proximity to us or how many other people are in a position to help). If this argument is sound, it shows that giving to famine relief and similar causes is not an act of charity (and therefore optional)-it is a stringent moral obligation. The second premise comes in two forms, strong and weak. The strong version says that we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." This principle requires us to give aid to the level of "marginal utility"-to the point where we could not give any more without causing as much suffering to ourselves or our families as we would ease by our giving. We must reduce our circumstances almost to the same degree of hardship experienced by those we are trying to aid. Singer thinks the strong principle is the correct one, but he believes the weak version would also transform how we view our obligations to the needy. According to this less stringent principle, we have a duty to prevent something bad from happening if we can do it without "sacrificing anything morally significant." It requires us not to sacrifice to the point of marginal utility but rather to stop spending money on comparatively trivial things. It would have us give money to famine relief instead of spending it on a new car or new clothes. -Singer believes that giving to the poor can be justified through Kantian ethics.