Exam 50: Roderick M.Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Self

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm says that determinism is consistent with human responsibility.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -According to Chisholm, the notion of agent causation is

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm thinks that there is a logical connection between wanting and doing.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -According to Chisholm, the notion of responsibility for an action conflicts with

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Leibniz says that a desire or motive may "incline without necessitating."

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm claims that it is not the case that every event involved in an act is caused by some other event.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm says that each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm rejects compatibilism.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm thinks that free actions are uncaused actions.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm's notion of agent causation is a very different kind of causation than what science recognizes.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -According to Chisholm, if the act of a sinner proceeds from God as the Prime Mover, then

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -According to Chisholm, the statements "he could have done otherwise" and "if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise"

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm believes that there are two different kinds of causation.

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm accepts the compatibilist's definition of "could do otherwise."

In this essay Chisholm argues that free actions are possible because they are caused not by indefinitely long sequences of preceding events but rather by an agent (or self). He calls the former kind of causation "event causation" and the latter "agent causation." In his view, when we act freely, we act like God-a prime mover that is itself unmoved, an uncaused cause of events. -Chisholm says that some acts are not caused at all.