Exam 8: William Paley: The Watch and the Watchmaker

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley says that the consciousness of knowing little need not cause a distrust of that which one does know.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley proves the existence of a God with restricted features.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley proves that the world had a designer, but not the Designer in Genesis.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley says that for us to conclude that a machine was the result of design or a designer, it is not necessary that the machine be

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley's argument, if cogent, proves that the designer of the world has infinite wisdom.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley admits that his argument could support the idea of self-supporting nature in need of no supernatural creature.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley thinks that the fact that a creation has defects shows that the creator must also have defects.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley says that a machine must be perfect to provide evidence that it had a designer.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Paley proves the existence of the God of traditional theism.