Exam 68: Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel argues that luck helps us control the results of our actions.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel's argument is related to the problem of free will.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Kant says that there cannot be moral risk.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel believes that a truck driver who accidentally runs his truck into a pedestrian is not affected by moral luck.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel puts forth a solution to the problem of moral luck.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel thinks that our notion of moral responsibility is

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel is concerned that very little about what we do is under our control.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel says that our "prior to reflection" intuition is that people cannot be

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Thomas Nagel argues that the Kantian way of viewing morality is

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -According to Nagel, a person can be morally responsible only for what he does, but what he does results from a great deal that he does not do.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -According to Nagel, the problem of moral luck is based on the conflict between (i) our intuition that someone's moral status cannot be altered by luck and (ii) the possibility that luck

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel says, "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel's central question is: Can luck ever make a moral difference?

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -For Nagel, a person can be legitimately judged to have committed an immoral act even though the action was not under her control.

Thomas Nagel is professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of several works in moral and political philosophy. In this selection Nagel challenges the Kantian way of viewing morality, which assumes that we are all equal rational participants in the moral enterprise, each having the same opportunity to be moral. Nagel suggests that this view is simplistic and fails to take into account the manner in which external factors impinge upon us. They introduce the idea of moral luck, which he defines thus: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." Four types of moral luck are considered: constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, consequential luck in which consequences retrospectively justify an otherwise immoral act (or fail to justify an otherwise moral act), and consequential luck in which the consequences affect the type of blame or remorse (or moral praise). -Nagel contends that ultimately the problem of luck never arises.