Exam 59: Immanuel Kant: The Moral Law

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant says that through reason and reflection we can derive our duties from

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant accepts Hume's theory of moral sentiments.

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant's theory puts strict limits on what can be universalized.

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant endorses the divine right of kings in a kingdom of ends.

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant believes that morality is contingent.

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant says that rational beings are called "persons."

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Kant believes that morality consists of hypothetical imperatives.

A common form of psychological egoism says that people perform actions-even actions that appear to be altruistic or selfless-solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure. But Feinberg argues that this view of the matter is muddled. It is much more likely that we act to obtain particular things, not satisfaction itself, and that we experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obtaining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that give us satisfaction when we acquire them. If the things themselves were not the object of our desires, it would be difficult to see how we could get any satisfaction from our attaining them. -Deontological ethics is equivalent to the Golden Rule.