Exam 20: Michael Martin: Faith and Foundationalism

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin concedes that like perception and memory, there are grounds for claiming that a belief in God is properly basic.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Plantinga contends that the evidentialist objection to theistic belief is typically rooted in

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin critiques Plantinga's view that belief in God is

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin asserts that belief in God seems inappropriate for inclusion in the class of basic belief.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin thinks Plantinga is a typical evidentialist.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -According to Martin, Plantinga argues that foundationalists are unable to justify

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin says that Plantinga's foundationalism puts any belief beyond rational appraisal once it is declared basic.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin points out that philosophers have argued that belief in God is unreasonable because there is insufficient evidence for it.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin agrees with Plantinga that there is a consensus in the Christian community about what beliefs are basic and what conditions justify these beliefs.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin contends that Plantinga's refutation of classical foundationalism has no relevance for contemporary foundationalism.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -According to Martin, on Plantinga's view, the rationality of any belief is absurdly easy to obtain.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin agrees that Plantinga's proposal would not allow any belief at all to become basic from the point of view some community.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -According to Martin, Plantinga argues that traditional arguments for the existence of God

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -Martin concludes that Plantinga's foundationalism is radically relativistic.

Michael Martin (1932-2015) was a professor at Boston University and author of several books including Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2002) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). He also edited several collections, most notably The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2006). Martin critiques Alvin Plantinga's argument that it is acceptable for persons to believe that God exists even if they cannot produce evidence or argument to justify that belief. Plantinga begins with the traditional philosophical view that all our beliefs are based ultimately on beliefs that are "properly basic"-they are either self-evident (such as "two plus two equals four") or evident to the senses (as when our looking at or remembering a tree shows immediately that there is or was a tree). To be counted as genuine knowledge our beliefs must be either properly basic or justified by beliefs that ultimately rest on those that are properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God can be a properly basic belief and thus require no supporting evidence. Martin argues, however, that because Plantinga's approach allows people to formulate their own properly basic criteria from their own unique experience and perspective, almost any belief-no matter how bizarre-could be considered properly basic. -According to Martin, Plantinga argues that classical foundationalists are being self-referentially inconsistent.