Exam 19: Alvin Plantinga: Religious Belief Without Evidence

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga argues that one has no rational obligation to support one's belief in God with evidence.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -According to Plantinga, the two premises of the evidentialist objection to belief in God are that (i) it is irrational or unreasonable to accept theistic belief without sufficient evidence and that (ii)

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -According to Plantinga, the evidentialist objection to theistic belief is typically rooted in

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga argues that only religious beliefs are properly basic.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga thinks we are obligated to always have evidence for our spiritual beliefs.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga says that foundationalists have a duty to believe in God.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga accepts classical foundationalism.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -According to Plantinga, belief in God is

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga thinks that someone who holds that belief in God is properly basic is committed to holding that belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -No beliefs are properly basic.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -According to Plantinga, in the right circumstances, a properly basic belief could be

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga is a typical evidentialist.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Many philosophers have argued that belief in God is unreasonable because there is insufficient evidence for it.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -According to Plantinga, many Reformed thinkers rejected natural theology.

In this essay Plantinga argues that it is rational to believe in God despite the lack of evidence for such belief. Those (such as W.K. Clifford) who insist that we must have evidence for all our beliefs simply fail to make their case because the evidentialists have not set forth clear criteria that would account for all the clear cases of justified beliefs and that would exclude the belief in God. Plantinga outlines the position of the foundationalist-evidentialist as claiming that all justified beliefs must either (i) be "properly basic" by fulfilling certain criteria or (ii) be based on other beliefs that eventually result in a treelike construction with properly basic beliefs at the bottom or foundation. Plantinga shows that many beliefs we seem to be justified in holding do not fit into the foundationalist framework: such beliefs as memory beliefs (e.g., that I ate breakfast this morning), belief in an external world, and belief in other minds. These beliefs do not depend on other beliefs, yet neither are they self-evident, incorrigible (impossible not to believe), or evident to the senses. Having shown the looseness of what we can accept as "properly basic," Plantinga next shows that the Protestant reformers saw belief in God as "properly basic." He asks us to consider this belief as a legitimate option and examines possible objections to it. -Plantinga is committed to saying that belief in the Great Pumpkin can be properly basic.