Exam 7: Paul Edwards: A Critique of the Cosmological Argument

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards rejects the contingency argument.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards claims that even if sound, the causal argument does not establish that the first cause presently exists.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards asserts that by rejecting a supernatural first cause, one is not then committed to the proposition that

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards argues that all natural objects require a sustaining (in esse) cause.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards agrees with Father Copleston.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards maintains that a series is not something over and above its members.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards admits that a better version of the causal argument can prove the existence of God.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards believes in a finite God.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -According to Edwards, the idea of an infinite regress of causes implies that nothing exists.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -According to Edwards, if sound, the causal argument shows that

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -According to Edwards, even if sound, the causal argument does not establish that the first cause is

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards says that even if the first-cause argument was sound, it would not prove the existence of God.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -According to Edwards, the advocates of the causal argument seem to confuse an infinite series with

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards believes that if you reject the notion of a supernatural first cause, you are committed to the view that there is a natural first cause.

In this article Edwards attacks the cosmological argument, specifically Aquinas's causal and contingency versions, holding that the argument fails at several points. Against the causal argument, he argues that the premise asserting the impossibility of an infinite series is false. Even if the argument were sound, he says, it would not prove the existence of a single first cause because a plurality of causes cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the argument is not helped by the theist's distinction between causes that bring something into existence (causes in fieri) and causes that sustain something in existence (causes in esse). Some defend the causal argument by insisting that even if there were an infinite series of causes, there still must be an ultimate cause of the series as a whole. Edwards counters that such notions rest on the "erroneous assumption that the series is something over and above the members of which it is composed." Against the contingency argument, Edwards maintains that to explain a contingent phenomenon, we do not need to posit a necessary being and that those who make such a demand beg the question at issue. -Edwards contends that a series is something over and above the members of which it is composed.