Exam 13: Financing the Deal

If the borrower defaults on the loan or otherwise fails to honor the terms of the agreement, the lender can seize and sell the collateral to recover the value of the loan only if the borrower agrees that it is unlikely that the loan will be repaid.

LBO capital structures are often very complex, consisting of bank debt, subordinated unsecured debt, preferred stock, and common equity.

An indenture is a contract between the firm that issues the long-term debt securities and the lenders.

Cash flow lenders view the borrower's future cash flow generation capability as the primary means of recovering a loan, while largely ignoring the assets of the LBO target.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Hollywood’s Biggest Independent Studios Combine in a Leveraged Buyout LBOs allow buyouts using relatively little cash and often rely heavily on the target firm’s assets to finance the transaction. Private equity investors often “cash out” of their investments by selling to a strategic buyer. ______________________________________________________________________________ The Lionsgate-Summit tie-up represented the culmination of more than four years of intermittent discussions between the two firms. The number of studios making and releasing movies has been shrinking amid falling DVD sales and continued efforts to transition to digital distribution. As the largest independent studios in Hollywood, both firms saw their cash flow whipsawed as one blockbuster hit would be followed by a series of failures. Film and TV program libraries offered the only source of cash flow stability due to the recurring fees paid by those licensing the rights to use this proprietary content. Lionsgate first approached Summit about a buyout in 2008 in an effort to bolster its film and TV library. However, it was not until early 2012 that the two sides could reach agreement. The time was ripe because Summit’s investors were looking for a way to cash in on the success of the firm’s Twilight movies series. Consisting of four films, this series had grossed $2.5 billion worldwide. On February 2, 2012, Lionsgate announced that it had reached an agreement to acquire Summit Entertainment by paying Summit shareholders $412.5 million in cash and stock for all of their outstanding shares and assumed debt of $506.3 million. According to the merger agreement, Lionsgate would provide administrative, production, and distribution services to Summit for a 10% servicing fee. Layoffs are expected at both firms as they merge redundant departments in their film operations, such as marketing, production, and distribution. The acquisition provides a windfall to Summit’s investors, including eBay cofounder Jeff Skoll’s film company Media and private equity fund Traverse Management. These investors had previously received a $200 million dividend as part of a recapitalization in early 2011 and gained handsomely from the sale to Lionsgate. Lionsgate is a diversified film and television production and distribution company, with a film library of 13,000 titles. The firm’s major distribution channels include home entertainment and prepackaged media (DVDs); digital distribution (on-demand TV) and pay TV (premium network programming). Summit, also a producer and distributor of film and TV content, has a less consistent track record in realizing successful releases, with the Twilight “franchise” its primary success. However, Summit does have strong international licensing operations, with arrangements in the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Scandinavia, Spain, and Australia. The acquisition also strengthens Lionsgate’s position as a leading content supplier and, controlling the Twilight and Hunger Games franchises, positions Lionsgate as a market leader for young adult audiences. The combination also results in cost and revenue synergies, more diversified cash flow streams, and greater access to international distribution channels. Figure 13.3 illustrates the subsidiary structure for completing the buyout of Summit Entertainment LLC. As is typical of such transactions, Lionsgate created a merger subsidiary (Merger Sub) and funded the subsidiary with its equity contribution of $100 million in cash and $69 million in Lionsgate stock, receiving 100% of the subsidiary’s stock in exchange. Merger Sub was further capitalized by a bank term loan of $500 million. Following a tender offer to Summit’s shareholders by Merger Sub, Merger Sub was merged into Summit Entertainment, with Summit surviving as a wholly owned subsidiary of Lionsgate in a reverse triangular merger. At closing, $284.4 million of Summit’s excess cash was used to finance the total cost of the deal. Lionsgate-Summit Legal and Financing Structure. Table 13.4 summarizes the sources of financing for the buyout and shows how these funds were used to pay for the deal. Lionsgate financed the total cost of the deal of $953.4 million (consisting of $412.5 million for Summit stock + the pretransaction term loan of $506.3 million + $34.6 million in transaction-related fees and expenses) as follows: $100 million in cash from Lionsgate and $69 million in Lionsgate stock + $284.4 million of the $310 million in cash on Summit’s balance sheet at closing + a new $500 million term loan. Summit’s $506.3 million term loan B was refinanced with the new term loan for $500 million as part of the transaction. The new term loan is an obligation of and is secured by the assets of Summit and its subsidiaries. It also is secured by a loan guarantee provided by Merger Sub, created by Lionsgate to consummate the transaction. The guarantee is secured by the equity in Summit held by Merger Sub. Lionsgate anticipates paying off the term loan well in advance of its 2016 maturity date out of future cash flows from new movie releases. Summit’s pretransaction net debt was $196.3 million (pretransaction term loan of $506.3 less total cash on the balance sheet of $310 million). Postclosing net debt increased to $474.4 million (postclosing term loan of $500 million less $25.6 million in total cash of the balance sheet). presents the key features of the new term loan B facility. Note how Summit’s assets are used as collateral to secure the loan. In addition, the lender has first priority on the proceeds from certain types of transactions, giving them priority access to such funds. Cash distributions are not possible until the loan is almost paid off, and even then the size of such distributions is limited. Finally, loan covenants require Summit to maintain a comparatively liquid position during the term of the loan. -What about Lionsgate's acquisition of Summit indicates that this transaction should be characterized as a leveraged buyout? How does Lionsgate use Summit's assets to help finance the deal? Be specific.

Cerberus Capital Management Acquires Chrysler Corporation According to the terms of the transaction, Cerberus would own 80.1 percent of Chrysler's auto manufacturing and financial services businesses in exchange for $7.4 billion in cash. Daimler would continue to own 19.9 percent of the new business, Chrysler Holdings LLC. Of the $7.4 billion, Daimler would receive $1.35 billion while the remaining $6.05 billion would be invested in Chrysler (i.e., $5.0 billion is to be invested in the auto manufacturing operation and $1.05 billion in the finance unit). Daimler also agreed to pay to Cerberus $1.6 billion to cover Chrysler's long-term debt and cumulative operating losses during the four months between the signing of the merger agreement and the actual closing. In acquiring Chrysler, Cerberus assumed responsibility for an estimated $18 billion in unfunded retiree pension and medical benefits. Daimler also agreed to loan Chrysler Holdings LLC $405 million. The transaction is atypical of those involving private equity investors, which usually take public firms private, expecting to later sell them for a profit. The private equity firm pays for the acquisition by borrowing against the firm's assets or cash flow. However, the estimated size of Chrysler's retiree health-care liabilities and the uncertainty of future cash flows make borrowing impractical. Therefore, Cerberus agreed to invest its own funds in the business to keep it running while it restructured the business. By going private, Cerberus would be able to focus on the long-term without the disruption of meeting quarterly earnings reports. Cerberus was counting on paring retiree health-care liabilities through aggressive negotiations with the United Auto Workers (UAW). Cerberus sought a deal similar to what the UAW accepted from Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in late 2006. Under this agreement, the management of $1.2 billion in health-care liabilities was transferred to a fund managed by the UAW, with Goodyear contributing $1 billion in cash and Goodyear stock. By transferring responsibility for these liabilities to the UAW, Chrysler believed that it would be able to cut in half the $30 dollar per hour labor cost advantage enjoyed by Toyota. Cerberus also expected to benefit from melding Chrysler's financial unit with Cerberus's 51 percent ownership stake in GMAC, GM's former auto financing business. By consolidating the two businesses, Cerberus hoped to slash cost by eliminating duplicate jobs, combining overlapping operations such as data centers and field offices, and increasing the number of loans generated by combining back-office operations. However, the 2008 credit market meltdown, severe recession, and subsequent free fall in auto sales threatened the financial viability of Chrysler, despite an infusion of U.S. government capital, and it’s leasing operations as well as GMAC. GMAC applied for commercial banking status to be able to borrow directly from the U.S. Federal Reserve. In late 2008, the U.S. Treasury purchased $6 billion in GMAC preferred stock to provide additional capital to the financially ailing firm. To avoid being classified as a bank holding company under direct government supervision, Cerberus reduced its ownership in 2009 to 14.9 percent of voting stock and 33 percent of total equity by distributing equity stakes to its coinvestors in GMAC. By surrendering its controlling interest in GMAC, it is less likely that Cerberus would be able to realize anticipated cost savings by combining the GMAC and Chrysler Financial operations. In early 2009, Chrysler entered into negotiations with Italian auto maker Fiat to gain access to the firm's technology in exchange for a 20 percent stake in Chrysler. -Cite examples of economies of scale and scope?

With their cash hoards accumulating at an unprecedented rate, there was little that buyout firms could do but to invest in larger firms. Consequently, the average size of LBO transactions grew significantly during 2005. In a move reminiscent of the blockbuster buyouts of the late 1980s, seven private investment firms acquired 100 percent of the outstanding stock of SunGard Data Systems Inc. (SunGard) in late 2005. SunGard is a financial software firm known for providing application and transaction software services and creating backup data systems in the event of disaster. The company‘s software manages 70 percent of the transactions made on the Nasdaq stock exchange, but its biggest business is creating backup data systems in case a client’s main systems are disabled by a natural disaster, blackout, or terrorist attack. Its large client base for disaster recovery and back-up systems provides a substantial and predictable cash flow. SunGard’s new owners include Silver lake Partners, Bain Capital LLC, The Blackstone Group L.P., Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Texas Pacific Group. Buyout firms in 2005 tended to band together to spread the risk of a deal this size and to reduce the likelihood of a bidding war. Indeed, with SunGard, there was only one bidder, the investor group consisting of these seven firms. The software side of SunGard is believed to have significant growth potential, while the disaster-recovery side provides a large stable cash flow. Unlike many LBOs, the deal was announced as being all about growth of the financial services software side of the business. The deal is structured as a merger, since SunGard would be merged into a shell corporation created by the investor group for acquiring SunGard. Going private, allows SunGard to invest heavily in software without being punished by investors, since such investments are expensed and reduce reported earnings per share. Going private also allows the firm to eliminate the burdensome reporting requirements of being a public company. The buyout represented potentially a significant source of fee income for the investor group. In addition to the 2 percent management fees buyout firms collect from investors in the funds they manage, they receive substantial fee income from each investment they make on behalf of their funds. For example, the buyout firms receive a 1 percent deal completion fee, which is more than $100 million in the SunGard transaction. Buyout firms also receive fees paid for by the target firm that is “going private” for arranging financing. Moreover, there are also fees for conducting due diligence and for monitoring the ongoing performance of the firm taken private. Finally, when the buyout firms exit their investments in the target firm via a sale to a strategic buyer or a secondary IPO, they receive 20 percent (i.e., so-called carry fee) of any profits. Under the terms of the agreement, SunGard shareholders received $36 per share, a 14 percent premium over the SunGard closing price as of the announcement date of March 28, 2005, and 40 percent more than when the news first leaked about the deal a week earlier. From the SunGard shareholders’ perspective, the deal is valued at $11.4 billion dollars consisting of $10.9 billion for outstanding shares and “in-the-money” options (i.e., options whose exercise price is less than the firm’s market price per share) plus $500 million in debt on the balance sheet. The seven equity investors provided $3.5 billion in capital with the remainder of the purchase price financed by commitments from a lending consortium consisting of Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Deutsche Bank. The purpose of the loans is to finance the merger, repay or refinance SunGard’s existing debt, provide ongoing working capital, and pay fees and expenses incurred in connection with the merger. The total funds necessary to complete the merger and related fees and expenses is approximately $11.3 billion, consisting of approximately $10.9 billion to pay SunGard’s stockholders and about $400.7 million to pay fees and expenses related to the merger and the financing arrangements. Note that the fees that are to be financed comprise almost 4 percent of the purchase price. Ongoing working capital needs and capital expenditures required obtaining commitments from lenders well in excess of $11.3 billion. The merger financing consists of several tiers of debt and “credit facilities.” Credit facilities are arrangements for extending credit. The senior secured debt and senior subordinated debt are intended to provide “permanent” or long-term financing. Senior debt covenants included restrictions on new borrowing, investments, sales of assets, mergers and consolidations, prepayments of subordinated indebtedness, capital expenditures, liens and dividends and other distributions, as well as a minimum interest coverage ratio and a maximum total leverage ratio. If the offering of notes is not completed on or prior to the closing, the banks providing the financing have committed to provide up to $3 billion in loans under a senior subordinated bridge credit facility. The bridge loans are intended as a form of temporary financing to satisfy immediate cash requirements until permanent financing can be arranged. A special purpose SunGard subsidiary will purchase receivables from SunGard, with the purchases financed through the sale of the receivables to the lending consortium. The lenders subsequently finance the purchase of the receivables by issuing commercial paper, which is repaid as the receivables are collected. The special purpose subsidiary is not shown on the SunGard balance sheet. Based on the value of receivables at closing, the subsidiary could provide up to $500 million. The obligation of the lending consortium to buy the receivables will expire on the sixth anniversary of the closing of the merger. The following table provides SunGard’s post-merger proforma capital structure. Note that the proforma capital structure is portrayed as if SunGard uses 100 percent of bank lending commitments. Also, note that individual LBO investors may invest monies from more than one fund they manage. This may be due to the perceived attractiveness of the opportunity or the limited availability of money in any single fund. Of the $9 billion in debt financing, bank loans constitute 56 percent and subordinated or mezzanine debt comprises represents 44 percent. The roman numeral II refers to the fund providing the equity capital managed by the partnership -Explain how the way in which the LBO is financed affects the way it is operated and the timing of when equity investors choose to exit the business. Be specific.

A leveraged buyout initiated by a firm's management is called a management buyout.

A single asset is often used to collateralize loans from different lenders in LBO transactions.

Lessons from Pep Boys’ Aborted Attempt to Go Private LBOs in recent years have involved financial sponsors’ providing a larger portion of the purchase price in cash than in the past. Financial sponsors focus increasingly on targets in which they have previous or related experience. Deals that would have been completed in the early 2000s are more likely to be terminated or subject to renegotiation than in the past. _____________________________________________________________________________________ It ain’t over till it’s over” quipped former New York Yankees’ catcher Yogi Berra, famous for his malapropisms. The oft-quoted comment was once again proven true in Pep Boys’ unsuccessful attempt to go private in 2012. On May 30, 2012, after nearly two years of discussions between Pep Boys and several interested parties, the firm announced that a buyout agreement with the Gores Group (Gores), valued at approximately $1 billion (including assumed debt), had collapsed, a victim of Pep Boys’ declining operating performance. The firm’s shares fell 20% on the news to $8.89 per share, well below its level following the all-cash $15-a-share deal with Gores announced in January 2012. The terms of the transaction also included a termination fee if either party failed to complete the deal by July 27, 2012. The failed transaction illustrates the characteristics and potential pitfalls common to contemporary LBOs. Pep Boys, a U.S. auto parts and repair business, operates more than 7,000 service bays in over 700 locations in 35 states and Puerto Rico. With its share price lagging the overall stock market in recent years, the firm’s board of directors explored a range of options for boosting the firm’s value and ultimately decided to put the firm up for sale. Gores was attracted initially by what appeared to be a low purchase price, stable cash flow, and the firm’s real estate holdings (many of the firm’s store sites are owned by the firm). Such assets could be used as collateral underlying loans to finance a portion of the purchase price. Furthermore, Gores has experience in retailing, having several retailers among their portfolio of companies, including J. Mendel and Mexx. The transaction reflected a structure common for deals of this type. Pep Boys had entered into a merger agreement with Auto Acquisitions Group (the Parent), a shell corporation funded by cash provided by Gores as the financial sponsor, and the Parent’s wholly owned subsidiary (Merger Sub). The Parent would contribute cash to Merger Sub, with Merger Sub borrowing the remainder from several lenders. Merger Sub would subsequently buy Pep Boys’ outstanding shares and merge with the firm. Pep Boys would survive as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Parent. The purpose of this reverse triangular merger was to preserve the Pep Boys’ brand name and facilitate the transfer of supplier and customer contracts. The Parent also was to have been organized as a holding company to afford investors some degree of protection from Pep Boys’ liabilities. The purchase price was to have been financed by an equity contribution of $489 million from limited partnerships managed by Gores and the balance by loans provided by Barclays Bank PLC, Credit Suisse AG, and Wells Fargo Bank. Upon learning that the Pep Boys’ reported earnings for the first quarter of 2012 would be well below expectations, Gores attempted to renegotiate the terms of the deal, arguing that Pep Boys had breached the deal’s agreements. With Pep Boys unwilling to accept a lower valuation, Gores exercised its right to terminate the deal by paying the $50 million breakup fee and agreed to reimburse Pep Boys for other costs it had incurred related to the deal. Pep Boys said the firm will use the proceeds of the breakup fee to refinance a portion of its outstanding debt. "Grave Dancer" Takes Tribune Corporation Private in an Ill-Fated Transaction At the closing in late December 2007, well-known real estate investor Sam Zell described the takeover of the Tribune Company as "the transaction from hell." His comments were prescient in that what had appeared to be a cleverly crafted, albeit highly leveraged, deal from a tax standpoint was unable to withstand the credit malaise of 2008. The end came swiftly when the 161-year-old Tribune filed for bankruptcy on December 8, 2008. On April 2, 2007, the Tribune Corporation announced that the firm's publicly traded shares would be acquired in a multistage transaction valued at $8.2 billion. Tribune owned at that time 9 newspapers, 23 television stations, a 25% stake in Comcast's SportsNet Chicago, and the Chicago Cubs baseball team. Publishing accounts for 75% of the firm's total $5.5 billion annual revenue, with the remainder coming from broadcasting and entertainment. Advertising and circulation revenue had fallen by 9% at the firm's three largest newspapers (Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and Newsday in New York) between 2004 and 2006. Despite aggressive efforts to cut costs, Tribune's stock had fallen more than 30% since 2005. The transaction was implemented in a two-stage transaction, in which Sam Zell acquired a controlling 51% interest in the first stage followed by a backend merger in the second stage in which the remaining outstanding Tribune shares were acquired. In the first stage, Tribune initiated a cash tender offer for 126 million shares (51% of total shares) for $34 per share, totaling $4.2 billion. The tender was financed using $250 million of the $315 million provided by Sam Zell in the form of subordinated debt, plus additional borrowing to cover the balance. Stage 2 was triggered when the deal received regulatory approval. During this stage, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) bought the rest of the shares at $34 a share (totaling about $4 billion), with Zell providing the remaining $65 million of his pledge. Most of the ESOP's 121 million shares purchased were financed by debt guaranteed by the firm on behalf of the ESOP. At that point, the ESOP held all of the remaining stock outstanding valued at about $4 billion. In exchange for his commitment of funds, Mr. Zell received a 15-year warrant to acquire 40% of the common stock (newly issued) at a price set at $500 million. Following closing in December 2007, all company contributions to employee pension plans were funneled into the ESOP in the form of Tribune stock. Over time, the ESOP would hold all the stock. Furthermore, Tribune was converted from a C corporation to a Subchapter S corporation, allowing the firm to avoid corporate income taxes. However, it would have to pay taxes on gains resulting from the sale of assets held less than ten years after the conversion from a C to an S corporation (Figure 1). The purchase of Tribune's stock was financed almost entirely with debt, with Zell's equity contribution amounting to less than 4% of the purchase price. The transaction resulted in Tribune being burdened with $13 billion in debt (including the approximate $5 billion currently owed by Tribune). At this level, the firm's debt was ten times EBITDA, more than two and a half times that of the average media company. Annual interest and principal repayments reached $800 million (almost three times their preacquisition level), about 62% of the firm's previous EBITDA cash flow of $1.3 billion. While the ESOP owned the company, it was not be liable for the debt guaranteed by Tribune. The conversion of Tribune into a Subchapter S corporation eliminated the firm's current annual tax liability of $348 million. Such entities pay no corporate income tax but must pay all profit directly to shareholders, who then pay taxes on these distributions. Since the ESOP was the sole shareholder, Tribune was expected to be largely tax exempt, since ESOPs are not taxed. In an effort to reduce the firm's debt burden, the Tribune Company announced in early 2008 the formation of a partnership in which Cablevision Systems Corporation would own 97% of Newsday for $650 million, with Tribune owning the remaining 3%. However, Tribune was unable to sell the Chicago Cubs (which had been expected to fetch as much as $1 billion) and the minority interest in SportsNet Chicago to help reduce the debt amid the 2008 credit crisis. The worsening of the recession, accelerated by the decline in newspaper and TV advertising revenue, as well as newspaper circulation, thereby eroded the firm's ability to meet its debt obligations. By filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, the Tribune Company sought a reprieve from its creditors while it attempted to restructure its business. Although the extent of the losses to employees, creditors, and other stakeholders is difficult to determine, some things are clear. Any pension funds set aside prior to the closing remain with the employees, but it is likely that equity contributions made to the ESOP on behalf of the employees since the closing would be lost. The employees would become general creditors of Tribune. As a holder of subordinated debt, Mr. Zell had priority over the employees if the firm was liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the creditors. Those benefitting from the deal included Tribune's public shareholders, including the Chandler family, which owed 12% of Tribune as a result of its prior sale of the Times Mirror to Tribune, and Dennis FitzSimons, the firm's former CEO, who received $17.7 million in severance and $23.8 million for his holdings of Tribune shares. Citigroup and Merrill Lynch received $35.8 million and $37 million, respectively, in advisory fees. Morgan Stanley received $7.5 million for writing a fairness opinion letter. Finally, Valuation Research Corporation received $1 million for providing a solvency opinion indicating that Tribune could satisfy its loan covenants. What appeared to be one of the most complex deals of 2007, designed to reap huge tax advantages, soon became a victim of the downward-spiraling economy, the credit crunch, and its own leverage. A lawsuit filed in late 2008 on behalf of Tribune employees contended that the transaction was flawed from the outset and intended to benefit Sam Zell and his advisors and Tribune’s board. Even if the employees win, they will simply have to stand in line with other Tribune creditors awaiting the resolution of the bankruptcy court proceedings. -Is this transaction taxable or non-taxable to Tribune's public shareholders? To its post-transaction shareholders? Explain your answer.

HCA's LBO Represents a High-Risk Bet on Growth While most LBOs are predicated on improving operating performance through a combination of aggressive cost cutting and revenue growth, HCA laid out an unconventional approach in its effort to take the firm private. On July 24, 2006, management again announced that it would "go private" in a deal valued at $33 billion including the assumption of $11.7 billion in existing debt. The approximate $21.3 billion purchase price for HCA's stock was financed by a combination of $12.8 billion in senior secured term loans of varying maturities and an estimated $8.5 billion in cash provided by Bain Capital, Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company. HCA also would take out a $4 billion revolving credit line to satisfy immediate working capital requirements. The firm publicly announced a strategy of improving performance through growth rather than through cost cutting. HCA's network of 182 hospitals and 94 surgery centers is expected to benefit from an aging U.S. population and the resulting increase in health-care spending. The deal also seems to be partly contingent on the government assuming a larger share of health-care costs in the future. Finally, with many nonprofit hospitals faltering financially, HCA may be able to acquire them inexpensively. While the longer-term trends in the health-care industry are unmistakable, shorter-term developments appear troublesome, including sluggish hospital admissions, more uninsured patients, and higher bad debt expenses. Moreover, with Medicare and Medicaid financially insolvent, it is unclear if future increases in government health-care spending would be sufficient to enable HCA investors to achieve their expected financial returns. With the highest operating profit margins in the industry, it is uncertain if HCA's cash flows could be significantly improved by cost cutting, if the revenue growth assumptions fail to materialize. HCA's management and equity investors have put themselves in a position in which they seem to have relatively little influence over the factors that directly affect the firm's future cash flows. -Dose a hospital or hospital system represent a good or bad LBO candidate? Explain your answer.

Limitations the lender imposes on the borrower on the amount of dividends that can be paid, the level of salaries and bonuses that may be given to the borrower's employees, the total amount of indebtedness that can be assumed by the borrower, and investments in plant and equipment and acquisitions are called affirmative covenants.

The growth in LBO activity is not simply a U.S. phenomenon. Western Europe has seen a veritable explosion in private equity investors taking companies private, reflecting ongoing liberalization in the European Union as well as cheap financing and industry consolidation.

Common exit strategies for LBOs include sale to a strategic buyer, an IPO, a leveraged recapitalization, or a sale to another buyout firm.

LBO exit strategies involving selling to a strategic buyer usually result in the best price as the buyer may be able to generate significant synergies by combining the firm with its existing business.

When a public company is subject to an LBO, it is said to be going private, because more than 50% of the equity of the firm has been purchased by a small group of investors and is no longer publicly traded.

LBOs may be consummated by establishing a new subsidiary that merges with the target. This may be done to avoid any negative impact that the new company might have on existing customer or creditor relationships.

Sony's long-term vision has been to create synergy between its consumer electronics products business and its music, movies, and games. On September 14, 2004, a consortium, consisting of Sony Corp of America, Providence Equity Partners, Texas Pacific Group, and DLJ Merchant Banking Partners, agreed to acquire MGM for $4.8 billion, consisting of $2.85 billion in cash and the assumption of $2 billion in debt. The cash portion of the purchase price consisted of about $1.8 billion in debt and $1 billion in equity capital. Of the equity capital, Providence contributed $450 million, Sony and Texas Pacific Group $300 million, and DLJ Merchant Banking $250 million. In what way do you believe that Sony's objectives might differ from those of the private equity investors making up the remainder of the consortium? How might such differences affect the management of MGM? Identify possible short-term and long-term effects.

The high premiums paid to LBO target shareholders reflect the tax benefits associated with the high leverage of such transactions and the improved operating efficiency following the completion of the buyout resulting from management incentive plans and the discipline imposed by the need to repay debt.

Debt issues not secured by specific assets are called debentures.