Exam 13: Financing the Deal: Private Equity, hedge Funds, and Other Sources of Funds

Most highly leveraged transactions consist of acquisitions of private rather public firms.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Pacific Investors Acquires California Kool in a Leveraged Buyout Pacific Investors (PI) is a small private equity limited partnership with $3 billion under management. The objective of the fund is to give investors at least a 30-percent annual average return on their investment by judiciously investing these funds in highly leveraged transactions. PI has been able to realize such returns over the last decade because of its focus on investing in industries that have slow but predictable growth in cash flow, modest capital investment requirements, and relatively low levels of research and development spending. In the past, PI made several lucrative investments in the contract packaging industry, which provides packaging for beverage companies that produce various types of noncarbonated and carbonated beverages. Because of its commitments to its investors, PI likes to liquidate its investments within four to six years of the initial investment through a secondary public offering or sale to a strategic investor. Following its past success in the industry, PI currently is negotiating with California Kool (CK), a privately owned contract beverage packaging company with the technology required to package many types of noncarbonated drinks. CK's 2003 revenue and net income are $190.4 million and $5.9 million, respectively. With a reputation for effective management, CK is a medium-sized contract packaging company that owns its own plant and equipment and has a history of continually increasing cash flow. The company also has significant unused excess capacity, suggesting that production levels can be increased without substantial new capital spending. The owners of CK are demanding a purchase price of $70 million. This is denoted on the balance sheet (see Table 13-15 at the end of the case) as a negative entry in additional paid-in capital. This price represents a multiple of 11.8 times 2003's net income, almost twice the multiple for comparable publicly traded companies. Despite the "rich" multiple, PI believes that it can finance the transaction through an equity investment of $25 million and $47 million in debt. The equity investment consists of $3 million in common stock, with PI's investors and CK's management each contributing $1.5 million. Debt consists of a $12 million revolving loan to meet immediate working capital requirements, $20 million in senior bank debt secured by CK's fixed assets, and $15 million in a subordinated loan from a pension fund. The total cost of acquiring CK is $72 million, $70 million paid to the owners of CK and $2 million in legal and accounting fees. As indicated on Table 13-15, the change in total liabilities plus shareholders' equity (i.e., total sources of funds or cash inflows) must equal the change in total assets (i.e., total uses of funds or cash outflows). Therefore, as shown in the adjustments column, total liabilities increase by $47 million in total borrowings and shareholders' equity declines by $45 million (i.e., $25 million in preferred and common equity provided by investors less $70 million paid to CK owners). The excess of sources over uses of $2 million is used to finance legal and accounting fees incurred in closing the transaction. Consequently, total assets increase by $2 million and total liabilities plus shareholders' equity increase by $2 million between the pre- and postclosing balance sheets as shown in the adjustments column.hasi¹ Delta;Total assets = ΔTotal liabilities + ΔShareholders' equity: $2 million = $47 million -$45 million = $2 million. Revenue for CK is projected to grow at 4.5 percent annually through the foreseeable future. Operating expenses and sales, general, and administrative expenses as a percent of sales are expected to decline during the first three years of operation due to aggressive cost cutting and the introduction of new management and engineering processes. Similarly, improved working capital management results in significant declines in working capital as a percent of sales during the first year of operation. Gross fixed assets as percent of sales is held constant at its 2003 level during the forecast period, reflecting reinvestment requirements to support the projected increase in net revenue. Equity cash flow adjusted to include cash generated in excess of normal operating requirements (i.e., denoted by the change in investments available for sale) is expected to reach $8.5 million annually by 2010. Using the cost of capital method, the cost of equity declines in line with the reduction in the firm's beta as the debt is repaid from 26 percent in 2004 to 16.5 percent in 2010. In contrast, the adjusted present value method employs a constant unlevered COE of 17 percent. The deal would appear to make sense from the standpoint of PI, since the projected average annual internal rates of return (IRRs) for investors exceed PI's minimum desired 30 percent rate of return in all scenarios considered between 2007 and 2009 (see Table 13-13). This is the period during which investors would like to "cash out." The rates of return scenarios are calculated assuming the business can be sold at different multiples of adjusted equity cash flow in the year in which the business is assumed to be sold. Consequently, IRRs are calculated using the cash outflow (initial equity investment in the business) in the first year offset by any positive equity cash flow from operations generated in the first year, equity cash flows for each subsequent year, and the sum of equity cash flow in the year in which the business is sold or taken public plus the estimated sale value (e.g., eight times equity cash flow) in that year. Adjusted equity cash flow includes free cash flow generated from operations and the increase in "investments available for sale." Such investments represent cash generated in excess of normal operating requirements; and as such, this cash is available to LBO investors. The actual point at which CK would either be taken public, sold to a strategic investor, or sold to another LBO fund depends on stock market conditions, CK's leverage relative to similar firms in the industry, and cash flow performance as compared to the plan. Discounted cash flow analysis also suggests that PI should do the deal, since the total present value of adjusted equity cash flow of $57.2 million using the CC method is more than twice the magnitude of the initial equity investment. At $56 million, the APV method results in a slightly lower estimate of total present value. See Tables 13-14,13-15, and 13-16 for the income, balance-sheet, and cash-flow statements, respectively, associated with this transaction. Exhibits 13-1 and 13-2 illustrate the calculation of present value of the transaction based on the cost of capital and the adjusted present value methods, respectively. Note the actual Excel spreadsheets and formulas used to create these financial tables are available on the CD-ROM accompanying this book in a worksheet, Excel-Based Leveraged Buyout Valuation and Structuring Model. -What criteria did Pacific Investors (PI)use to select California Kool (CK)as a target for an LBO? Why were these criteria employed?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions RJR NABISCO GOES PRIVATE- KEY SHAREHOLDER AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES Background The largest LBO in history is as well known for its theatrics as it is for its substantial improvement in shareholder value. In October 1988, H. Ross Johnson, then CEO of RJR Nabisco, proposed an MBO of the firm at $75 per share. His failure to inform the RJR board before publicly announcing his plans alienated many of the directors. Analysts outside the company placed the breakup value of RJR Nabisco at more than $100 per share-almost twice its then current share price. Johnson's bid immediately was countered by a bid by the well-known LBO firm, Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts (KKR), to buy the firm for $90 per share (Wasserstein, 1998). The firm's board immediately was faced with the dilemma of whether to accept the KKR offer or to consider some other form of restructuring of the company. The board appointed a committee of outside directors to assess the bid to minimize the appearance of a potential conflict of interest in having current board members, who were also part of the buyout proposal from management, vote on which bid to select. The bidding war soon escalated with additional bids coming from Forstmann Little and First Boston, although the latter's bid never really was taken very seriously. Forstmann Little later dropped out of the bidding as the purchase price rose. Although the firm's investment bankers valued both the bids by Johnson and KKR at about the same level, the board ultimately accepted the KKR bid. The winning bid was set at almost $25 billion-the largest transaction on record at that time and the largest LBO in history. Banks provided about three-fourths of the $20 billion that was borrowed to complete the transaction. The remaining debt was supplied by junk bond financing. The RJR shareholders were the real winners, because the final purchase price constituted a more than 100% return from the $56 per share price that existed just before the initial bid by RJR management. Aggressive pricing actions by such competitors as Phillip Morris threatened to erode RJR Nabisco's ability to service its debt. Complex securities such as "increasing rate notes," whose coupon rates had to be periodically reset to ensure that these notes would trade at face value, ultimately forced the credit rating agencies to downgrade the RJR Nabisco debt. As market interest rates climbed, RJR Nabisco did not appear to have sufficient cash to accommodate the additional interest expense on the increasing return notes. To avoid default, KKR recapitalized the company by investing additional equity capital and divesting more than $5 billion worth of businesses in 1990 to help reduce its crushing debt load. In 1991, RJR went public by issuing more than $1 billion in new common stock, which placed about one-fourth of the firm's common stock in public hands. When KKR eventually fully liquidated its position in RJR Nabisco in 1995, it did so for a far smaller profit than expected. KKR earned a profit of about $60 million on an equity investment of $3.1 billion. KKR had not done well for the outside investors who had financed more than 90% of the total equity investment in KKR. However, KKR fared much better than investors had in its LBO funds by earning more than $500 million in transaction fees, advisor fees, management fees, and directors' fees. The publicity surrounding the transaction did not cease with the closing of the transaction. Dissident bondholders filed suits alleging that the payment of such a large premium for the company represented a "confiscation" of bondholder wealth by shareholders. Potential Conflicts of Interest In any MBO, management is confronted by a potential conflict of interest. Their fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders is to take actions to maximize shareholder value; yet in the RJR Nabisco case, the management bid appeared to be well below what was in the best interests of shareholders. Several proposals have been made to minimize the potential for conflict of interest in the case of an MBO, including that directors, who are part of an MBO effort, not be allowed to participate in voting on bids, that fairness opinions be solicited from independent financial advisors, and that a firm receiving an MBO proposal be required to hold an auction for the firm. The most contentious discussion immediately following the closing of the RJR Nabisco buyout centered on the alleged transfer of wealth from bond and preferred stockholders to common stockholders when a premium was paid for the shares held by RJR Nabisco common stockholders. It often is argued that at least some part of the premium is offset by a reduction in the value of the firm's outstanding bonds and preferred stock because of the substantial increase in leverage that takes place in LBOs. Winners and Losers RJR Nabisco shareholders before the buyout clearly benefited greatly from efforts to take the company private. However, in addition to the potential transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders, some critics of LBOs argue that a wealth transfer also takes place in LBO transactions when LBO management is able to negotiate wage and benefit concessions from current employee unions. LBOs are under greater pressure to seek such concessions than other types of buyouts because they need to meet huge debt service requirements. : -Describe the potential benefits and costs of LBOs to shareholders,employers,lenders,customers,and communities in which the firm undergoing the buyout may have operations.Do you believe that on average LBOs provide a net benefit or cost to society? Explain your answer.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Case Study. Private Equity Firms Acquire Yellow Pages Business Qwest Communications agreed to sell its yellow pages business, QwestDex, to a consortium led by the Carlyle Group and Welsh, Carson, Anderson and Stowe for $7.1 billion. In a two stage transaction, Qwest sold the eastern half of the yellow pages business for $2.75 billion in late 2002. This portion of the business included directories in Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, and North Dakota. The remainder of the business, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, was sold for $4.35 billion in late 2003. Caryle and Welsh Carson each put in $775 million in equity (about 21 percent of the total purchase price). Qwest was in a precarious financial position at the time of the negotiation. The telecom was trying to avoid bankruptcy and needed the first stage financing to meet impending debt repayments due in late 2002. Qwest is a local phone company in 14 western states and one of the nation's largest long-distance carriers. It had amassed $26.5 billion in debt following a series of acquisitions during the 1990s. The Carlyle Group has invested globally, mainly in defense and aerospace businesses, but it has also invested in companies in real estate, health care, bottling, and information technology. Welsh Carson focuses primarily on the communications and health care industries. While the yellow pages business is quite different from their normal areas of investment, both firms were attracted by its steady cash flow. Such cash flow could be used to trim debt over time and generate a solid return. The business' existing management team will continue to run the operation under the new ownership. Financing for the deal will come from J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia Securities, and Deutsche Bank. The investment groups agreed to a two stage transaction to facilitate borrowing the large amounts required and to reduce the amount of equity each buyout firm had to invest. By staging the purchase, the lenders could see how well the operations acquired during the first stage could manage their debt load. The new company will be the exclusive directory publisher for Qwest yellow page needs at the local level and will provide all of Qwest's publishing requirements under a fifty year contract. Under the arrangement, Qwest will continue to provide certain services to its former yellow pages unit, such as billing and information technology, under a variety of commercial services and transitional services agreements (Qwest: 2002). -Why was QwestDex considered an attractive LBO candidate? Do you think it has significant growth potential? Explain the following statement: "A business with high growth potential may not be a good candidate for an LBO.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Cox Enterprises Offers to Take Cox Communications Private In an effort to take the firm private, Cox Enterprises announced on August 3, 2004 a proposal to buy the remaining 38% of Cox Communications' shares that they did not currently own for $32 per share. Cox Communications is the third largest provider of cable television, telecommunications, and wireless services in the U.S, serving more than 6.2 million customers. Historically, the firm's cash flow has been steady and substantial. The deal is valued at $7.9 billion and represented a 16% premium to Cox Communication's share price at that time. Cox Communications would become a subsidiary of Cox Enterprises and would continue to operate as an autonomous business. In response to the proposal, the Cox Communications Board of Directors formed a special committee of independent directors to consider the proposal. Citigroup Global Markets and Lehman Brothers Inc. have committed $10 billion to the deal. Cox Enterprises would use $7.9 billion for the tender offer, with the remaining $2.1 billion used for refinancing existing debt and to satisfy working capital requirements. Cable service firms have faced intensified competitive pressures from satellite service providers DirecTV Group and EchoStar communications. Moreover, telephone companies continue to attack cable's high-speed Internet service by cutting prices on high-speed Internet service over phone lines. Cable firms have responded by offering a broader range of advanced services like video-on-demand and phone service. Since 2000, the cable industry has invested more than $80 billion to upgrade their systems to provide such services, causing profitability to deteriorate and frustrating investors. In response, cable company stock prices have fallen. Cox Enterprises stated that the increasingly competitive cable industry environment makes investment in the cable industry best done through a private company structure. :: -Why does Cox Enterprises believe that the investment needed for growing its cable business is best done through a private company structure?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Financing Challenges in the Home Depot Supply Transaction Buyout firms Bain Capital, Carlyle Group, and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) bid $10.3 billion in June 2007 to buy Home Depot Inc.'s HD Supply business. HD Supply represented a collection of small suppliers of construction products. Home Depot had announced earlier in the year that it planned to use the proceeds of the sale to pay for a portion of a $22.5 billion stock buyback. Three banks, Lehman Brothers, JPMorgan Chase, and Merril Lynch agreed to provide the firms with a $4 billion loan. The repayment of the loans was predicated on the ability of the buyout firms to improve significantly HD Supply's current cash flow. Such loans are normally made with the presumption that they can be sold to investors, with the banks collecting fees from both the borrower and investor groups. However, by July, concern about the credit quality of subprime mortgages spread to the broader debt market and raised questions about the potential for default of loans made to finance highly leveraged transactions. The concern was particularly great for so-called "covenant-lite" loans for which the repayment terms were very lenient. Fearing they would not be able to resell such loans to investors, the three banks involved in financing the HD Supply transaction wanted more financial protection. Additional protection, they reasoned, would make such loans more marketable to investors. They used the upheaval in the credit markets as a pretext for reopening negotiations on their previous financing commitments. Home Depot was willing to lower the selling price thereby reducing the amount of financing required by the buyout firms and was willing to guarantee payment in the event of default by the buyout firms. While Bain, Carlyle, and CD&R were willing to increase their cash investment and pay higher fees to the banks, they were unwilling to alter the original terms of the loans. Eventually the banks agreed to provide financing consisting of a $1 billion "covenant-lite" loan and a $1.3 billion "payment-in-kind" loan. Home Depot agreed to assume the loan payments on the $1 billion loan if the investor firms were to default and to lower the selling price to $8.5 billion for 87.5 percent of HD Supply, with Home Depot retaining the remaining 12.5 percent. By the end of August, Home Depot had succeeded in raising the cash needed to help pay for its share repurchase, and the banks had reduced their original commitment of $4 billion in loans to $2.3 billion. While they had agreed to put more money into the transaction, the buyout firms had been successful in limiting the number of new restrictive covenants. Case Study : -Based on the information given it the case,determine the amount of the price reduction Home Depot accepted for HD Supply and the amount of cash the three buyout firms put into the transaction?

Financial buyers usually hold onto their investments for at least 15-20 years.

A common technique used during the 1990s was to wait for favorable periods in the stock market to sell a portion of the LBO's equity to the public.The proceeds of the issue would be used to repay debt,thereby reducing the LBO's financial risk.

An affirmative covenant is a portion of a loan agreement that specifies the actions the borrowing firm cannot take during the term of the loan.

Typical LBO targets are in mature industries such as manufacturing,retailing,textiles,food processing,apparel,and soft drinks.

Junk bonds have invariably proved to be a reliable source of low-cost financing in LBO transactions during the last 30 years.

The risk associated with overpaying is magnified for leveraged buyout transactions.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Financing LBOs--The SunGard Transaction With their cash hoards accumulating at an unprecedented rate, there was little that buyout firms could do but to invest in larger firms. Consequently, the average size of LBO transactions grew significantly during 2005. In a move reminiscent of the blockbuster buyouts of the late 1980s, seven private investment firms acquired 100 percent of the outstanding stock of SunGard Data Systems Inc. (SunGard) in late 2005. SunGard is a financial software firm known for providing application and transaction software services and creating backup data systems in the event of disaster. The company's software manages 70 percent of the transactions made on the Nasdaq stock exchange, but its biggest business is creating backup data systems in case a client's main systems are disabled by a natural disaster, blackout, or terrorist attack. Its large client base for disaster recovery and back-up systems provides a substantial and predictable cash flow. SunGard's new owners include Silver lake Partners, Bain Capital LLC, The Blackstone Group L.P., Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Texas Pacific Group. Buyout firms in 2005 tended to band together to spread the risk of a deal this size and to reduce the likelihood of a bidding war. Indeed, with SunGard, there was only one bidder, the investor group consisting of these seven firms. The software side of SunGard is believed to have significant growth potential, while the disaster-recovery side provides a large stable cash flow. Unlike many LBOs, the deal was announced as being all about growth of the financial services software side of the business. The deal is structured as a merger, since SunGard would be merged into a shell corporation created by the investor group for acquiring SunGard. Going private, allows SunGard to invest heavily in software without being punished by investors, since such investments are expensed and reduce reported earnings per share. Going private also allows the firm to eliminate the burdensome reporting requirements of being a public company. The buyout represented potentially a significant source of fee income for the investor group. In addition to the 2 percent management fees buyout firms collect from investors in the funds they manage, they receive substantial fee income from each investment they make on behalf of their funds. For example, the buyout firms receive a 1 percent deal completion fee, which is more than $100 million in the SunGard transaction. Buyout firms also receive fees paid for by the target firm that is "going private" for arranging financing. Moreover, there are also fees for conducting due diligence and for monitoring the ongoing performance of the firm taken private. Finally, when the buyout firms exit their investments in the target firm via a sale to a strategic buyer or a secondary IPO, they receive 20 percent (i.e., so-called carry fee) of any profits. Under the terms of the agreement, SunGard shareholders received $36 per share, a 14 percent premium over the SunGard closing price as of the announcement date of March 28, 2005, and 40 percent more than when the news first leaked about the deal a week earlier. From the SunGard shareholders' perspective, the deal is valued at $11.4 billion dollars consisting of $10.9 billion for outstanding shares and "in-the-money" options (i.e., options whose exercise price is less than the firm's market price per share) plus $500 million in debt on the balance sheet. The seven equity investors provided $3.5 billion in capital with the remainder of the purchase price financed by commitments from a lending consortium consisting of Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Deutsche Bank. The purpose of the loans is to finance the merger, repay or refinance SunGard's existing debt, provide ongoing working capital, and pay fees and expenses incurred in connection with the merger. The total funds necessary to complete the merger and related fees and expenses is approximately $11.3 billion, consisting of approximately $10.9 billion to pay SunGard's stockholders and about $400.7 million to pay fees and expenses related to the merger and the financing arrangements. Note that the fees that are to be financed comprise almost 4 percent of the purchase price. Ongoing working capital needs and capital expenditures required obtaining commitments from lenders well in excess of $11.3 billion. The merger financing consists of several tiers of debt and "credit facilities." Credit facilities are arrangements for extending credit. The senior secured debt and senior subordinated debt are intended to provide "permanent" or long-term financing. Senior debt covenants included restrictions on new borrowing, investments, sales of assets, mergers and consolidations, prepayments of subordinated indebtedness, capital expenditures, liens and dividends and other distributions, as well as a minimum interest coverage ratio and a maximum total leverage ratio. If the offering of notes is not completed on or prior to the closing, the banks providing the financing have committed to provide up to $3 billion in loans under a senior subordinated bridge credit facility. The bridge loans are intended as a form of temporary financing to satisfy immediate cash requirements until permanent financing can be arranged. A special purpose SunGard subsidiary will purchase receivables from SunGard, with the purchases financed through the sale of the receivables to the lending consortium. The lenders subsequently finance the purchase of the receivables by issuing commercial paper, which is repaid as the receivables are collected. The special purpose subsidiary is not shown on the SunGard balance sheet. Based on the value of receivables at closing, the subsidiary could provide up to $500 million. The obligation of the lending consortium to buy the receivables will expire on the sixth anniversary of the closing of the merger. The following table provides SunGard's post-merger proforma capital structure. Note that the proforma capital structure is portrayed as if SunGard uses 100 percent of bank lending commitments. Also, note that individual LBO investors may invest monies from more than one fund they manage. This may be due to the perceived attractiveness of the opportunity or the limited availability of money in any single fund. Of the $9 billion in debt financing, bank loans constitute 56 percent and subordinated or mezzanine debt comprises represents 44 percent. SunGard Proforma Capital Structure ¹The roman numeral II refers to the fund providing the equity capital managed by the partnership. Case Study : -Why are payment-in-kind securities (e.g.,debt or preferred stock)particularly well suited for financing LBOs? Under what circumstances might they be most attractive to lenders or investors?

LBO investors often use public offerings of the firm's stock or sell the firm to a strategic buyer in order to exit the business.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Cox Enterprises Offers to Take Cox Communications Private In an effort to take the firm private, Cox Enterprises announced on August 3, 2004 a proposal to buy the remaining 38% of Cox Communications' shares that they did not currently own for $32 per share. Cox Communications is the third largest provider of cable television, telecommunications, and wireless services in the U.S, serving more than 6.2 million customers. Historically, the firm's cash flow has been steady and substantial. The deal is valued at $7.9 billion and represented a 16% premium to Cox Communication's share price at that time. Cox Communications would become a subsidiary of Cox Enterprises and would continue to operate as an autonomous business. In response to the proposal, the Cox Communications Board of Directors formed a special committee of independent directors to consider the proposal. Citigroup Global Markets and Lehman Brothers Inc. have committed $10 billion to the deal. Cox Enterprises would use $7.9 billion for the tender offer, with the remaining $2.1 billion used for refinancing existing debt and to satisfy working capital requirements. Cable service firms have faced intensified competitive pressures from satellite service providers DirecTV Group and EchoStar communications. Moreover, telephone companies continue to attack cable's high-speed Internet service by cutting prices on high-speed Internet service over phone lines. Cable firms have responded by offering a broader range of advanced services like video-on-demand and phone service. Since 2000, the cable industry has invested more than $80 billion to upgrade their systems to provide such services, causing profitability to deteriorate and frustrating investors. In response, cable company stock prices have fallen. Cox Enterprises stated that the increasingly competitive cable industry environment makes investment in the cable industry best done through a private company structure. :: -Why did the board feel that it was appropriate to set up special committee of independent board directors?

Cash flow lenders view the borrower's future cash flow generation capability as the primary means of recovering a loan,while largely ignoring the assets of the LBO target.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Case Study. Sony Buys MGM Sony's long-term vision has been to create synergy between its consumer electronics products and music, movies, and games. Sony, which bought Columbia Pictures in 1989 for $3.4 billion, had wanted to control Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's film library for years, but it did not want to pay the estimated $5 billion it would take to acquire it. On September 14, 2004, a consortium, consisting of Sony Corp of America, Providence Equity Partners, Texas Pacific Group, and DLJ Merchant Banking Partners, agreed to acquire MGM for $4.8 billion, consisting of $2.85 billion in cash and the assumption of $2 billion in debt. The cash portion of the purchase price consisted of about $1.8 billion in debt and $1 billion in equity capital. Of the equity capital, Providence contributed $450 million, Sony and Texas Pacific Group $300 million, and DLJ Merchant Banking $250 million. The combination of Sony and MGM will create the world's largest film library of about 7,600 titles, with MGM contributing about 54 percent of the combined libraries. Sony will control MGM and Comcast will distribute the films over cable TV. Sony will shut down MGM's film making operations and move all operations to Sony. Kirk Kerkorian, who holds a 74 percent stake in MGM, will make $2 billion because of the transaction. The private equity partners could cash out within three-to-five years, with the consortium undertaking an initial public offering or sale to a strategic investor. Major risks include the ability of the consortium partners to maintain harmonious relations and the problematic growth potential of the DVD market. Sony and MGM negotiations had proven to be highly contentious for almost five months when media giant Time Warner Inc. emerged to attempt to satisfy Kerkorian's $5 billion asking price. The offer was made in stock on the assumption that Kerkorian would want a tax-free transaction. MGM's negotiations with Time Warner stalled around the actual value of Time Warner stock, with Kerkorian leery about Time Warner's future growth potential. Time Warner changed its bid in late August to an all cash offer, albeit somewhat lower than the Sony consortium bid, but it was more certain. Sony still did not have all of its financing in place. Time Warner had a "handshake agreement" with MGM by Labor Day for $11 per share, about $.25 less than Sony's. The Sony consortium huddled throughout the Labor Day weekend to put in place the financing for a bid of $12 per share. What often takes months to work out in most leveraged buyouts was hammered out in three days of marathon sessions at law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell. In addition to getting final agreement on financing arrangements including loan guarantees from J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Sony was able to reach agreement with Comcast to feature MGM movies in new cable and video-on-demand TV channels. This distribution mechanism meant additional revenue for Sony, making it possible to increase the bid to $12 per share. Sony also offered to make a $150 non-refundable cash payment to MGM. As a testament to the adage that timing is everything, the revised Sony bid was faxed to MGM just before the beginning of a board meeting to approve the Time Warner offer. : -Do you believe that MGM is an attractive LBO candidate? Why? Why not?

An investor group acquired all of the publicly traded shares of a firm.Once acquired,such shares would no longer trade publicly.Which of the following terms best describes this situation?

The loan agreement stipulates the terms and conditions under which the lender will loan the borrower funds.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions "Grave Dancer" Takes Tribune Corporation Private in an Ill-Fated Transaction At the closing in late December 2007, well-known real estate investor Sam Zell described the takeover of the Tribune Company as "the transaction from hell." His comments were prescient in that what had appeared to be a cleverly crafted, albeit highly leveraged, deal from a tax standpoint was unable to withstand the credit malaise of 2008. The end came swiftly when the 161-year-old Tribune filed for bankruptcy on December 8, 2008. On April 2, 2007, the Tribune Corporation announced that the firm's publicly traded shares would be acquired in a multistage transaction valued at $8.2 billion. Tribune owned at that time 9 newspapers, 23 television stations, a 25% stake in Comcast's SportsNet Chicago, and the Chicago Cubs baseball team. Publishing accounts for 75% of the firm's total $5.5 billion annual revenue, with the remainder coming from broadcasting and entertainment. Advertising and circulation revenue had fallen by 9% at the firm's three largest newspapers (Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and Newsday in New York) between 2004 and 2006. Despite aggressive efforts to cut costs, Tribune's stock had fallen more than 30% since 2005. The transaction was implemented in a two-stage transaction, in which Sam Zell acquired a controlling 51% interest in the first stage followed by a backend merger in the second stage in which the remaining outstanding Tribune shares were acquired. In the first stage, Tribune initiated a cash tender offer for 126 million shares (51% of total shares) for $34 per share, totaling $4.2 billion. The tender was financed using $250 million of the $315 million provided by Sam Zell in the form of subordinated debt, plus additional borrowing to cover the balance. Stage 2 was triggered when the deal received regulatory approval. During this stage, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) bought the rest of the shares at $34 a share (totaling about $4 billion), with Zell providing the remaining $65 million of his pledge. Most of the ESOP's 121 million shares purchased were financed by debt guaranteed by the firm on behalf of the ESOP. At that point, the ESOP held all of the remaining stock outstanding valued at about $4 billion. In exchange for his commitment of funds, Mr. Zell received a 15-year warrant to acquire 40% of the common stock (newly issued) at a price set at $500 million. Following closing in December 2007, all company contributions to employee pension plans were funneled into the ESOP in the form of Tribune stock. Over time, the ESOP would hold all the stock. Furthermore, Tribune was converted from a C corporation to a Subchapter S corporation, allowing the firm to avoid corporate income taxes. However, it would have to pay taxes on gains resulting from the sale of assets held less than ten years after the conversion from a C to an S corporation (Figure 1). Figure 13.1 Tribune deal structure. The purchase of Tribune's stock was financed almost entirely with debt, with Zell's equity contribution amounting to less than 4% of the purchase price. The transaction resulted in Tribune being burdened with $13 billion in debt (including the approximate $5 billion currently owed by Tribune). At this level, the firm's debt was ten times EBITDA, more than two and a half times that of the average media company. Annual interest and principal repayments reached $800 million (almost three times their preacquisition level), about 62% of the firm's previous EBITDA cash flow of $1.3 billion. While the ESOP owned the company, it was not be liable for the debt guaranteed by Tribune. The conversion of Tribune into a Subchapter S corporation eliminated the firm's current annual tax liability of $348 million. Such entities pay no corporate income tax but must pay all profit directly to shareholders, who then pay taxes on these distributions. Since the ESOP was the sole shareholder, Tribune was expected to be largely tax exempt, since ESOPs are not taxed. In an effort to reduce the firm's debt burden, the Tribune Company announced in early 2008 the formation of a partnership in which Cablevision Systems Corporation would own 97% of Newsday for $650 million, with Tribune owning the remaining 3%. However, Tribune was unable to sell the Chicago Cubs (which had been expected to fetch as much as $1 billion) and the minority interest in SportsNet Chicago to help reduce the debt amid the 2008 credit crisis. The worsening of the recession, accelerated by the decline in newspaper and TV advertising revenue, as well as newspaper circulation, thereby eroded the firm's ability to meet its debt obligations. By filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, the Tribune Company sought a reprieve from its creditors while it attempted to restructure its business. Although the extent of the losses to employees, creditors, and other stakeholders is difficult to determine, some things are clear. Any pension funds set aside prior to the closing remain with the employees, but it is likely that equity contributions made to the ESOP on behalf of the employees since the closing would be lost. The employees would become general creditors of Tribune. As a holder of subordinated debt, Mr. Zell had priority over the employees if the firm was liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the creditors. Those benefitting from the deal included Tribune's public shareholders, including the Chandler family, which owed 12% of Tribune as a result of its prior sale of the Times Mirror to Tribune, and Dennis FitzSimons, the firm's former CEO, who received $17.7 million in severance and $23.8 million for his holdings of Tribune shares. Citigroup and Merrill Lynch received $35.8 million and $37 million, respectively, in advisory fees. Morgan Stanley received $7.5 million for writing a fairness opinion letter. Finally, Valuation Research Corporation received $1 million for providing a solvency opinion indicating that Tribune could satisfy its loan covenants. What appeared to be one of the most complex deals of 2007, designed to reap huge tax advantages, soon became a victim of the downward-spiraling economy, the credit crunch, and its own leverage. A lawsuit filed in late 2008 on behalf of Tribune employees contended that the transaction was flawed from the outset and intended to benefit Sam Zell and his advisors and Tribune's board. Even if the employees win, they will simply have to stand in line with other Tribune creditors awaiting the resolution of the bankruptcy court proceedings. : -Comment on the fairness of this transaction to the various stakeholders involved.How would you apportion the responsibility for the eventual bankruptcy of Tribune among Sam Zell and his advisors,the Tribune board,and the largely unforeseen collapse of the credit markets in late 2008? Be specific.