Exam 4: Planning,developing Business,and Acquisition Plans: Phases 1 and 2 of the Acquisition Process

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Adobe's Acquisition of Omniture: Field of Dreams Marketing? On September 14, 2009, Adobe announced its acquisition of Omniture for $1.8 billion in cash or $21.50 per share. Adobe CEO Shantanu Narayen announced that the firm was pushing into new business at a time when customers were scaling back on purchases of the company's design software. Omniture would give Adobe a steady source of revenue and may mean investors would focus less on Adobe's ability to migrate its customers to product upgrades such as Adobe Creative Suite. Adobe's business strategy is to develop a new line of software that was compatible with Microsoft applications. As the world's largest developer of design software, Adobe licenses such software as Flash, Acrobat, Photoshop, and Creative Suite to website developers. Revenues grow as a result of increased market penetration and inducing current customers to upgrade to newer versions of the design software. In recent years, a business model has emerged in which customers can "rent" software applications for a specific time period by directly accessing the vendors' servers online or downloading the software to the customer's site. Moreover, software users have shown a tendency to buy from vendors with multiple product offerings to achieve better product compatibility. Omniture makes software designed to track the performance of websites and online advertising campaigns. Specifically, its Web analytic software allows its customers to measure the effectiveness of Adobe's content creation software. Advertising agencies and media companies use Omniture's software to analyze how consumers use websites. It competes with Google and other smaller participants. Omniture charges customers fees based on monthly website traffic, so sales are somewhat less sensitive than Adobe's. When the economy slows, Adobe has to rely on squeezing more revenue from existing customers. Omniture benefits from the takeover by gaining access to Adobe customers in different geographic areas and more capital for future product development. With annual revenues of more than $3 billion, Adobe is almost ten times the size of Omniture. Immediately following the announcement, Adobe's stock fell 5.6 percent to $33.62, after having gained about 67 percent since the beginning of 2009. In contrast, Omniture shares jumped 25 percent to $21.63, slightly above the offer price of $21.50 per share. While Omniture's share price move reflected the significant premium of the offer price over the firm's preannouncement share price, the extent to which investors punished Adobe reflected widespread unease with the transaction. Investors seem to be questioning the price paid for Omniture, whether the acquisition would actually accelerate and sustain revenue growth, the impact on the future cyclicality of the combined businesses, the ability to effectively integrate the two firms, and the potential profitability of future revenue growth. Each of these factors is considered next. Adobe paid 18 times projected 2010 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, a proxy for operating cash flow. Considering that other Web acquisitions were taking place at much lower multiples, investors reasoned that Adobe had little margin for error. If all went according to plan, the firm would earn an appropriate return on its investment. However, the likelihood of any plan being executed flawlessly is problematic. Adobe anticipates that the acquisition will expand its addressable market and growth potential. Adobe anticipates significant cross-selling opportunities in which Omniture products can be sold to Adobe customers. With its much larger customer base, this could represent a substantial new outlet for Omniture products. The presumption is that by combining the two firms, Adobe will be able to deliver more value to its customers. Adobe plans to merge its programs that create content for websites with Omniture's technology. For designers, developers, and online marketers, Adobe believes that integrated development software will streamline the creation and delivery of relevant content and applications. The size of the market for such software is difficult to gauge. Not all of Adobe's customers will require the additional functionality that would be offered. Google Analytic Services, offered free of charge, has put significant pressure on Omniture's earnings. However, firms with large advertising budgets are less likely to rely on the viability of free analytic services. Adobe also is attempting to diversify into less cyclical businesses. However, both Adobe and Omniture are impacted by fluctuations in the volume of retail spending. Less retail spending implies fewer new websites and upgrades to existing websites, which directly impacts Adobe's design software business, and less advertising and retail activity on electronic commerce sites negatively impacts Omniture's revenues. Omniture receives fees based on the volume of activity on a customer's site. Integrating the Omniture measurement capabilities into Adobe software design products and cross-selling Omniture products into the Adobe customer base require excellent coordination and cooperation between Adobe and Omniture managers and employees. Achieving such cooperation often is a major undertaking, especially when the Omniture shareholders, many of whom were employees, were paid in cash. The use of Adobe stock would have given them additional impetus to achieve these synergies in order to boost the value of their shares. Achieving cooperation may be slowed by the lack of organizational integration of Omniture into Adobe. Omniture will become a new business unit within Adobe, with Omniture's CEO, Josh James, joining Adobe as a senior vice president of the new business unit. He will report to Narayen. This arrangement may have been made to preserve Omniture's corporate culture. Adobe is betting that the potential increase in revenues will grow profits of the combined firms despite Omniture's lower margins. Whether the acquisition will contribute to overall profit growth depends on which products contribute to future revenue growth. The lower margins associated with Omniture's products would slow overall profit growth if the future growth in revenue came largely from Omniture's Web analytic products. -How would the combined firms be able to better satisfy these needs than the competition?

Management can obtain insight into the firm's probable future cash requirements and in turn its value by determining its position in its industry's product life cycle.

Acquisition plan objectives should be directly linked to key business plan objectives.

Market profiling entails collecting sufficient data to accurately assess and characterize a firm's competitive environment within its chosen markets.

The market targeted by the firm should reflect the fit between the corporation's primary strengths and competencies and its ability to satisfy customer needs better than the competition.

Which of the following are not components of the negotiation phase of the acquisition process?

A competitive self-assessment involves an analysis of the firm's absolute strengths and weaknesses.

While management's upfront involvement in the acquisition process is crucial,management should largely disengage from the process until the transaction is completed.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Adobe's Acquisition of Omniture: Field of Dreams Marketing? On September 14, 2009, Adobe announced its acquisition of Omniture for $1.8 billion in cash or $21.50 per share. Adobe CEO Shantanu Narayen announced that the firm was pushing into new business at a time when customers were scaling back on purchases of the company's design software. Omniture would give Adobe a steady source of revenue and may mean investors would focus less on Adobe's ability to migrate its customers to product upgrades such as Adobe Creative Suite. Adobe's business strategy is to develop a new line of software that was compatible with Microsoft applications. As the world's largest developer of design software, Adobe licenses such software as Flash, Acrobat, Photoshop, and Creative Suite to website developers. Revenues grow as a result of increased market penetration and inducing current customers to upgrade to newer versions of the design software. In recent years, a business model has emerged in which customers can "rent" software applications for a specific time period by directly accessing the vendors' servers online or downloading the software to the customer's site. Moreover, software users have shown a tendency to buy from vendors with multiple product offerings to achieve better product compatibility. Omniture makes software designed to track the performance of websites and online advertising campaigns. Specifically, its Web analytic software allows its customers to measure the effectiveness of Adobe's content creation software. Advertising agencies and media companies use Omniture's software to analyze how consumers use websites. It competes with Google and other smaller participants. Omniture charges customers fees based on monthly website traffic, so sales are somewhat less sensitive than Adobe's. When the economy slows, Adobe has to rely on squeezing more revenue from existing customers. Omniture benefits from the takeover by gaining access to Adobe customers in different geographic areas and more capital for future product development. With annual revenues of more than $3 billion, Adobe is almost ten times the size of Omniture. Immediately following the announcement, Adobe's stock fell 5.6 percent to $33.62, after having gained about 67 percent since the beginning of 2009. In contrast, Omniture shares jumped 25 percent to $21.63, slightly above the offer price of $21.50 per share. While Omniture's share price move reflected the significant premium of the offer price over the firm's preannouncement share price, the extent to which investors punished Adobe reflected widespread unease with the transaction. Investors seem to be questioning the price paid for Omniture, whether the acquisition would actually accelerate and sustain revenue growth, the impact on the future cyclicality of the combined businesses, the ability to effectively integrate the two firms, and the potential profitability of future revenue growth. Each of these factors is considered next. Adobe paid 18 times projected 2010 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, a proxy for operating cash flow. Considering that other Web acquisitions were taking place at much lower multiples, investors reasoned that Adobe had little margin for error. If all went according to plan, the firm would earn an appropriate return on its investment. However, the likelihood of any plan being executed flawlessly is problematic. Adobe anticipates that the acquisition will expand its addressable market and growth potential. Adobe anticipates significant cross-selling opportunities in which Omniture products can be sold to Adobe customers. With its much larger customer base, this could represent a substantial new outlet for Omniture products. The presumption is that by combining the two firms, Adobe will be able to deliver more value to its customers. Adobe plans to merge its programs that create content for websites with Omniture's technology. For designers, developers, and online marketers, Adobe believes that integrated development software will streamline the creation and delivery of relevant content and applications. The size of the market for such software is difficult to gauge. Not all of Adobe's customers will require the additional functionality that would be offered. Google Analytic Services, offered free of charge, has put significant pressure on Omniture's earnings. However, firms with large advertising budgets are less likely to rely on the viability of free analytic services. Adobe also is attempting to diversify into less cyclical businesses. However, both Adobe and Omniture are impacted by fluctuations in the volume of retail spending. Less retail spending implies fewer new websites and upgrades to existing websites, which directly impacts Adobe's design software business, and less advertising and retail activity on electronic commerce sites negatively impacts Omniture's revenues. Omniture receives fees based on the volume of activity on a customer's site. Integrating the Omniture measurement capabilities into Adobe software design products and cross-selling Omniture products into the Adobe customer base require excellent coordination and cooperation between Adobe and Omniture managers and employees. Achieving such cooperation often is a major undertaking, especially when the Omniture shareholders, many of whom were employees, were paid in cash. The use of Adobe stock would have given them additional impetus to achieve these synergies in order to boost the value of their shares. Achieving cooperation may be slowed by the lack of organizational integration of Omniture into Adobe. Omniture will become a new business unit within Adobe, with Omniture's CEO, Josh James, joining Adobe as a senior vice president of the new business unit. He will report to Narayen. This arrangement may have been made to preserve Omniture's corporate culture. Adobe is betting that the potential increase in revenues will grow profits of the combined firms despite Omniture's lower margins. Whether the acquisition will contribute to overall profit growth depends on which products contribute to future revenue growth. The lower margins associated with Omniture's products would slow overall profit growth if the future growth in revenue came largely from Omniture's Web analytic products. -Who are Adobe's and Omniture's customers and what are their needs?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Consolidation in the Global Pharmaceutical Industry: The Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham Example By the mid-1980s, demands from both business and government were forcing pharmaceutical companies to change the way they did business. Increased government intervention, lower selling prices, increased competition from generic drugs, and growing pressure for discounting from managed care organizations such as health maintenance and preferred provider organizations began to squeeze drug company profit margins. The number of contact points between the sales force and the customer shrank dramatically as more drugs were being purchased through managed care organizations and pharmacy benefit managers. Drugs commonly were sold in large volumes and often at heavily discounted levels. The demand for generic drugs also was declining. The use of formularies, drug lists from which managed care doctors are required to prescribe, gave doctors less choice and made them less responsive to direct calls from the sales force. The situation was compounded further by the ongoing consolidation in the hospital industry. Hospitals began centralizing purchasing and using stricter formularies, allowing physicians virtually no leeway to prescribe unlisted drugs. The growing use of formularies resulted in buyers needing fewer drugs and sharply reduced the need for similar drugs. The industry's first major wave of consolidations took place in the late 1980s, with such mergers as SmithKline and Beecham and Bristol Myers and Squibb. This wave of consolidation was driven by increased scale and scope economies largely realized through the combination of sales and marketing staffs. Horizontal consolidation represented a considerable value creation opportunity for those companies able to realize cost synergies. In analyzing the total costs of pharmaceutical companies, William Pursche (1996) argued that the potential savings from mergers could range from 15-25% of total R&D spending, 5-20% of total manufacturing costs, 15-50% of marketing and sales expenses, and 20-50% of overhead costs. Continued consolidation seemed likely, enabling further cuts in sales and marketing expenses. Formulary-driven purchasing and declining overall drug margins spurred pharmaceutical companies to take action to increase the return on their R&D investments. Because development costs are not significantly lower for generic drugs, it became increasingly difficult to generate positive financial returns from marginal products. Duplicate overhead offered another opportunity for cost savings through consolidation, because combining companies could eliminate redundant personnel in such support areas as quality assurance, manufacturing management, information services, legal services, accounting, and human resources. The second merger wave began in the late 1990s. The sheer magnitude and pace of activity is striking. Of the top-20 companies in terms of global pharmaceutical sales in 1998, one-half either have merged or announced plans to do so. More are expected as drug patents expire for a number of companies during the next several years and the cost of discovering and commercializing new drugs continues to escalate. On January 17, 2000, British pharmaceutical giants Glaxo Wellcome PLC and SmithKline Beecham PLC agreed to merge to form what was at the time the world's largest drug company. The merger was valued at $76 billion. The resulting company was called Glaxo SmithKline and had annual revenue of $25 billion and a market value of $184 billion. The combined companies also would have a total R&D budget of $4 billion and a global sales force of 40,000. Total employees would number 105,000 worldwide. Although stressed as a merger of equals, Glaxo shareholders would own about 59% of the shares of the two companies. The combined companies would have a market share of 7.5% of the global pharmaceutical market. The companies projected annual pretax cost savings of about $1.76 billion after 3 years. The cost savings would come primarily from job cuts among middle management and administration over the next 3 years : -What was driving change in the pharmaceutical industry in the late 1990s?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions eBay Struggles to Reinvigorate Growth Founded in September 1995, eBay views itself as the world's online market place for the sale of goods and services to a diverse community of individuals and small businesses. Currently, eBay has sites in 24 different countries, and it offers a wide variety of tools, features, and services enabling members to buy and sell on its sites. The firm's primary business is Markeplaces consisting of eBay, Shopping.com, and classified websites. In 2006, this business accounted for 90 percent of eBay's sales and profits. Historically, acquisitions made by eBay have always been related to e-commerce. For example, concern about slowing growth in its core U.S. market caused eBay to acquire online payments provider, PayPal, in 2002. The firm achieved significant synergy between eBay and PayPal by facilitating payments between buyers and sellers. In late 2005, eBay announced that it had acquired Skype International SA, a firm whose software enabled PC users to make calls over the internet, for $2.6 billion. Skype had revenue of $60 million in 2005, a tiny fraction of eBay's $4.4 billion in 2005 sales, and it was unprofitable. Skype's existing businesses include services that give people the ability to call landline phones for about 3 cents a minute, voicemail, and providing a traditional phone number for Skype accounts. Skype is facing new competition from Google, Yahoo!, and many startups. eBay expects Skype to facilitate trade on their sites by increasing the ability of buyers and sellers to negotiate. In addition to paying eBay listing and completed-auction fees, sellers also could pay eBay a fee for getting an internet call, or lead, via Skype. eBay will also use Skype to facilitate entering new markets, such as new cars, travel, real estate, and personal and business services. Skype software gives eBay an advantage in China, Eastern Europe and Brazil, where online trust is not well-established and where haggling may be more a part of the culture. The acquisition of a telephony company represented a marked departure for eBay, which had previously acquired companies directly related to e-commerce. eBay is venturing into new territory without any overt request from or support of its buyers and sellers. Historically, buyers and sellers guided eBay into new markets through their activities, such as embracing PayPal years before eBay acquired it, or by requesting new features. In the past when eBAy has gone off on its own, such as collaborating with Christy's for live auctions, it has been unsuccessful. Only time will tell how well this acquisition will work. : -What are some of the key assumptions implicit in eBay's decision to make this acquisition?

The experience curve is most important in analyzing industries with low fixed costs.

Which of the following are common objectives of an external analysis?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Oracle Continues Its Efforts to Consolidate the Software Industry Oracle CEO Larry Ellison continued his effort to implement his software industry strategy when he announced the acquisition of Siebel Systems Inc. for $5.85 billion in stock and cash on September 13, 2005. The global software industry includes hundreds of firms. During the first nine months of 2005, Oracle had closed seven acquisitions, including its recently completed $10.6 billion hostile takeover of PeopleSoft. In each case, Oracle realized substantial cost savings by terminating duplicate employees and related overhead expenses. The Siebel acquisition accelerates the drive by Oracle to overtake SAP as the world's largest maker of business applications software, which automates a wide range of administrative tasks. The consolidation strategy seeks to add the existing business of a competitor, while broadening the customer base for Oracle's existing product offering. Siebel, founded by Ellison's one-time protégé turned bitter rival, Tom Siebel, gained prominence in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s as a leader in customer relationship management (CRM) software. CRM software helps firms track sales, customer service, and marketing functions. Siebel's dominance of this market has since eroded amidst complaints that the software was complicated and expensive to install. Moreover, Siebel ignored customer requests to deliver the software via the Internet. Also, aggressive rivals, like SAP and online upstart Salesforce.com have cut into Siebel's business in recent years with simpler offerings. Siebel's annual revenue had plunged from about $2.1 billion in 2001 to $1.3 billion in 2004. In the past, Mr. Ellison attempted to hasten Siebel's demise, declaring in 2003 that Siebel would vanish and putting pressure on the smaller company by revealing he had held takeover talks with the firm's CEO, Thomas Siebel. Ellison's public announcement of these talks heightened the personal enmity between the two CEOs, making Siebel an unwilling seller. Oracle's intensifying focus on business applications software largely reflects the slowing growth of its database product line, which accounts for more than three fourths of the company's sales. Siebel's technology and deep customer relationships give Oracle a competitive software bundle that includes a database, middleware (i.e., software that helps a variety of applications work together as if they were a single system), and high-quality customer relationship management software. The acquisition also deprives Oracle competitors, such as IBM, of customers for their services business. Customers, who once bought the so-called best-of-breed products, now seek a single supplier to provide programs that work well together. Oracle pledged to deliver an integrated suite of applications by 2007. What brought Oracle and Siebel together in the past was a shift in market dynamics. The customer and the partner community is communicating quite clearly that they are looking for an integrated set of products. Germany's SAP, Oracle's major competitor in the business applications software market, played down the impact of the merger, saying they had no reason to react and described any deals SAP is likely to make as "targeted, fill-in acquisitions." For IBM, the Siebel deal raised concerns about the computer giant's partners falling under the control of a competitor. IBM and Oracle compete fiercely in the database software market. Siebel has worked closely with IBM, as did PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards, which had been purchased by PeopleSoft shortly before its acquisition by Oracle. Retek, another major partner of IBM, had also been recently acquired by Oracle. IBM had declared its strategy to be a key partner to thousands of software vendors and that it would continue to provide customers with IBM hardware, middleware, and other applications. : -What other benefits for Oracle,and for the remaining competitors such as SAP,do you see from further industry consolidation? Be specific.

An acquisition plan entails all of the following except for

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions CenturyTel Buys Qwest Communications to Cut Costs and Buy Time as the Landline Market Shrinks Key Points: • Market segmentation can be used to identify "underserved" segments which may sustain firms whose competitive position in larger markets is weak. • A firm's competitive relative is best viewed in comparison to those firms competing in its served market rather than with industry leading firms. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ In what could best be described as a defensive acquisition, CenturyTel, the fifth largest local phone company in the United States, acquired Qwest Communications, the country's third largest, in mid-2010 in a stock swap valued at $10.6 billion. While both firms are dwarfed in size by AT&T and Verizon, these second-tier telecommunications firms will control a larger share of the shrinking landline market. The combined firms will have about 17 million phone lines serving customers in 37 states. This compares to AT&T and Verizon with about 46 and 32 million landline customers, respectively. The deal would enable the firms to reduce expenses in the wake of the annual 10 percent decline in landline usage as people switch from landlines to wireless and cable connections. Expected annual cost savings total $575 million; additional revenue could come from upgrading Qwest's landlines to handle DSL Internet. In 2010, about one-fourth of U.S. homes used only cell phones, and cable behemoth Comcast, with 7.6 million residential and business phone subscribers, ranked as the nation's fourth largest landline provider. CenturyTel has no intention of moving into the wireless and cable markets, which are maturing rapidly and are highly competitive. While neither Qwest nor CenturyTel owns wireless networks and therefore cannot offset the decline in landline customers as AT&T and Verizon are attempting to do, the combined firms are expected to thrive in rural areas where they have extensive coverage. In such geographic areas, broadband cable Internet access and fiber-optics data transmission line coverage are is limited. The lack of fast cable and fiber-optics transmission makes voice over Internet protocol (VOIP)-Internet phone service offered by cable companies and independent firms such as Vonage-unavailable. Consequently, customers are forced to use landlines if they want a home phone. Furthermore, customers in these areas must use landlines to gain access to the Internet through dial-up access or through a digital subscriber line (DSL). Discussion Questions 1. How would you describe CenturyTel's business strategy? Be specific. 2. Describe the key factors both external and internal to the firm that you believe are driving this strategy. 3. Why might the acquisition of Qwest be described as defensive? Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Oracle Continues Its Efforts to Consolidate the Software Industry Oracle CEO Larry Ellison continued his effort to implement his software industry strategy when he announced the acquisition of Siebel Systems Inc. for $5.85 billion in stock and cash on September 13, 2005. The global software industry includes hundreds of firms. During the first nine months of 2005, Oracle had closed seven acquisitions, including its recently completed $10.6 billion hostile takeover of PeopleSoft. In each case, Oracle realized substantial cost savings by terminating duplicate employees and related overhead expenses. The Siebel acquisition accelerates the drive by Oracle to overtake SAP as the world's largest maker of business applications software, which automates a wide range of administrative tasks. The consolidation strategy seeks to add the existing business of a competitor, while broadening the customer base for Oracle's existing product offering. Siebel, founded by Ellison's one-time protégé turned bitter rival, Tom Siebel, gained prominence in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s as a leader in customer relationship management (CRM) software. CRM software helps firms track sales, customer service, and marketing functions. Siebel's dominance of this market has since eroded amidst complaints that the software was complicated and expensive to install. Moreover, Siebel ignored customer requests to deliver the software via the Internet. Also, aggressive rivals, like SAP and online upstart Salesforce.com have cut into Siebel's business in recent years with simpler offerings. Siebel's annual revenue had plunged from about $2.1 billion in 2001 to $1.3 billion in 2004. In the past, Mr. Ellison attempted to hasten Siebel's demise, declaring in 2003 that Siebel would vanish and putting pressure on the smaller company by revealing he had held takeover talks with the firm's CEO, Thomas Siebel. Ellison's public announcement of these talks heightened the personal enmity between the two CEOs, making Siebel an unwilling seller. Oracle's intensifying focus on business applications software largely reflects the slowing growth of its database product line, which accounts for more than three fourths of the company's sales. Siebel's technology and deep customer relationships give Oracle a competitive software bundle that includes a database, middleware (i.e., software that helps a variety of applications work together as if they were a single system), and high-quality customer relationship management software. The acquisition also deprives Oracle competitors, such as IBM, of customers for their services business. Customers, who once bought the so-called best-of-breed products, now seek a single supplier to provide programs that work well together. Oracle pledged to deliver an integrated suite of applications by 2007. What brought Oracle and Siebel together in the past was a shift in market dynamics. The customer and the partner community is communicating quite clearly that they are looking for an integrated set of products. Germany's SAP, Oracle's major competitor in the business applications software market, played down the impact of the merger, saying they had no reason to react and described any deals SAP is likely to make as "targeted, fill-in acquisitions." For IBM, the Siebel deal raised concerns about the computer giant's partners falling under the control of a competitor. IBM and Oracle compete fiercely in the database software market. Siebel has worked closely with IBM, as did PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards, which had been purchased by PeopleSoft shortly before its acquisition by Oracle. Retek, another major partner of IBM, had also been recently acquired by Oracle. IBM had declared its strategy to be a key partner to thousands of software vendors and that it would continue to provide customers with IBM hardware, middleware, and other applications. -Why might the acquisition of Qwest be described as defensive?

Firms adopting a focus strategy compete primarily based on their superior understanding of how to satisfy their customers needs better than the competition.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Oracle Continues Its Efforts to Consolidate the Software Industry Oracle CEO Larry Ellison continued his effort to implement his software industry strategy when he announced the acquisition of Siebel Systems Inc. for $5.85 billion in stock and cash on September 13, 2005. The global software industry includes hundreds of firms. During the first nine months of 2005, Oracle had closed seven acquisitions, including its recently completed $10.6 billion hostile takeover of PeopleSoft. In each case, Oracle realized substantial cost savings by terminating duplicate employees and related overhead expenses. The Siebel acquisition accelerates the drive by Oracle to overtake SAP as the world's largest maker of business applications software, which automates a wide range of administrative tasks. The consolidation strategy seeks to add the existing business of a competitor, while broadening the customer base for Oracle's existing product offering. Siebel, founded by Ellison's one-time protégé turned bitter rival, Tom Siebel, gained prominence in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s as a leader in customer relationship management (CRM) software. CRM software helps firms track sales, customer service, and marketing functions. Siebel's dominance of this market has since eroded amidst complaints that the software was complicated and expensive to install. Moreover, Siebel ignored customer requests to deliver the software via the Internet. Also, aggressive rivals, like SAP and online upstart Salesforce.com have cut into Siebel's business in recent years with simpler offerings. Siebel's annual revenue had plunged from about $2.1 billion in 2001 to $1.3 billion in 2004. In the past, Mr. Ellison attempted to hasten Siebel's demise, declaring in 2003 that Siebel would vanish and putting pressure on the smaller company by revealing he had held takeover talks with the firm's CEO, Thomas Siebel. Ellison's public announcement of these talks heightened the personal enmity between the two CEOs, making Siebel an unwilling seller. Oracle's intensifying focus on business applications software largely reflects the slowing growth of its database product line, which accounts for more than three fourths of the company's sales. Siebel's technology and deep customer relationships give Oracle a competitive software bundle that includes a database, middleware (i.e., software that helps a variety of applications work together as if they were a single system), and high-quality customer relationship management software. The acquisition also deprives Oracle competitors, such as IBM, of customers for their services business. Customers, who once bought the so-called best-of-breed products, now seek a single supplier to provide programs that work well together. Oracle pledged to deliver an integrated suite of applications by 2007. What brought Oracle and Siebel together in the past was a shift in market dynamics. The customer and the partner community is communicating quite clearly that they are looking for an integrated set of products. Germany's SAP, Oracle's major competitor in the business applications software market, played down the impact of the merger, saying they had no reason to react and described any deals SAP is likely to make as "targeted, fill-in acquisitions." For IBM, the Siebel deal raised concerns about the computer giant's partners falling under the control of a competitor. IBM and Oracle compete fiercely in the database software market. Siebel has worked closely with IBM, as did PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards, which had been purchased by PeopleSoft shortly before its acquisition by Oracle. Retek, another major partner of IBM, had also been recently acquired by Oracle. IBM had declared its strategy to be a key partner to thousands of software vendors and that it would continue to provide customers with IBM hardware, middleware, and other applications. : -In what way do you think the Oracle strategy was targeting key competitors? Be specific.

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Consolidation in the Global Pharmaceutical Industry: The Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham Example By the mid-1980s, demands from both business and government were forcing pharmaceutical companies to change the way they did business. Increased government intervention, lower selling prices, increased competition from generic drugs, and growing pressure for discounting from managed care organizations such as health maintenance and preferred provider organizations began to squeeze drug company profit margins. The number of contact points between the sales force and the customer shrank dramatically as more drugs were being purchased through managed care organizations and pharmacy benefit managers. Drugs commonly were sold in large volumes and often at heavily discounted levels. The demand for generic drugs also was declining. The use of formularies, drug lists from which managed care doctors are required to prescribe, gave doctors less choice and made them less responsive to direct calls from the sales force. The situation was compounded further by the ongoing consolidation in the hospital industry. Hospitals began centralizing purchasing and using stricter formularies, allowing physicians virtually no leeway to prescribe unlisted drugs. The growing use of formularies resulted in buyers needing fewer drugs and sharply reduced the need for similar drugs. The industry's first major wave of consolidations took place in the late 1980s, with such mergers as SmithKline and Beecham and Bristol Myers and Squibb. This wave of consolidation was driven by increased scale and scope economies largely realized through the combination of sales and marketing staffs. Horizontal consolidation represented a considerable value creation opportunity for those companies able to realize cost synergies. In analyzing the total costs of pharmaceutical companies, William Pursche (1996) argued that the potential savings from mergers could range from 15-25% of total R&D spending, 5-20% of total manufacturing costs, 15-50% of marketing and sales expenses, and 20-50% of overhead costs. Continued consolidation seemed likely, enabling further cuts in sales and marketing expenses. Formulary-driven purchasing and declining overall drug margins spurred pharmaceutical companies to take action to increase the return on their R&D investments. Because development costs are not significantly lower for generic drugs, it became increasingly difficult to generate positive financial returns from marginal products. Duplicate overhead offered another opportunity for cost savings through consolidation, because combining companies could eliminate redundant personnel in such support areas as quality assurance, manufacturing management, information services, legal services, accounting, and human resources. The second merger wave began in the late 1990s. The sheer magnitude and pace of activity is striking. Of the top-20 companies in terms of global pharmaceutical sales in 1998, one-half either have merged or announced plans to do so. More are expected as drug patents expire for a number of companies during the next several years and the cost of discovering and commercializing new drugs continues to escalate. On January 17, 2000, British pharmaceutical giants Glaxo Wellcome PLC and SmithKline Beecham PLC agreed to merge to form what was at the time the world's largest drug company. The merger was valued at $76 billion. The resulting company was called Glaxo SmithKline and had annual revenue of $25 billion and a market value of $184 billion. The combined companies also would have a total R&D budget of $4 billion and a global sales force of 40,000. Total employees would number 105,000 worldwide. Although stressed as a merger of equals, Glaxo shareholders would own about 59% of the shares of the two companies. The combined companies would have a market share of 7.5% of the global pharmaceutical market. The companies projected annual pretax cost savings of about $1.76 billion after 3 years. The cost savings would come primarily from job cuts among middle management and administration over the next 3 years : -How would you classify the typical drug company's strategy in the 1970s and 1980s: cost leadership,differentiation,focus,or hybrid? Explain your answer.How have their strategies changed in recent years?

Contingency plans are actions that are taken as an alternative to the firm's current business strategy.