Question 1

Common law is shaped by the legal principle:

Accepted Answer

A)  Stare decisis. 
B)  Caveat emptor. 
C)  Post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
D)  Annuit coeptis. 
E)  Novus ordo seclorum. 
A)  Stare decisis. 
B)  Caveat emptor. 
C)  Post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
D)  Annuit coeptis. 
E)  Novus ordo seclorum.

Question 2

Suppose that in the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopt a diligent strategy is $10. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $100. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.40. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.35 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.25. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a pure-strict-liability tort law regime?

Accepted Answer

A)  {Negligent, Negligent}. 
B)  {Negligent, Diligent}. 
C)  {Diligent, Negligent}. 
D)  {Diligent, Diligent}. 
E)  There is no unique Nash equilibrium. 
A)  {Negligent, Negligent}. 
B)  {Negligent, Diligent}. 
C)  {Diligent, Negligent}. 
D)  {Diligent, Diligent}. 
E)  There is no unique Nash equilibrium.

Question 3

_____ deals with an area of jurisprudence in which an act of commission or omission by one individual results in injury to another:

Accepted Answer

A)  Criminal law. 
B)  Contract law. 
C)  Tort law. 
D)  Constitutional law. 
E)  Common law. 
A)  Criminal law. 
B)  Contract law. 
C)  Tort law. 
D)  Constitutional law. 
E)  Common law.

Question 4

s
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.6, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Negligent, Negligent}. 
B)  {Diligent, Negligent}. 
C)  {Negligent, Diligent}. 
D)  {Diligent, Diligent}. 
E)  Answers b and c are correct. 
A)  {Negligent, Negligent}. 
B)  {Diligent, Negligent}. 
C)  {Negligent, Diligent}. 
D)  {Diligent, Diligent}. 
E)  Answers b and c are correct.

Question 5

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.11. If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Negligent, Negligent}. 
B)  {Diligent, Negligent}. 
C)  {Negligent, Diligent}. 
D)  {Diligent, Diligent}. 
E)  Answers b and c are correct. 
A)  {Negligent, Negligent}. 
B)  {Diligent, Negligent}. 
C)  {Negligent, Diligent}. 
D)  {Diligent, Diligent}. 
E)  Answers b and c are correct.

Common law is shaped by the legal principle:

_____ deals with an area of jurisprudence in which an act of commission or omission by one individual results in injury to another:

s -Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.6, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

Introduction to Game Theory

Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Dynamic Games With Complete

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters

Exam 14: Torts and Contracts

Common law is shaped by the legal principle:

_____ deals with an area of jurisprudence in which an act of commission or omission by one individual results in injury to another:

s -Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.6, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

Introduction to Game Theory

Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Dynamic Games With Complete

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters