Exam 14: Torts and Contracts
Exam 1: Introduction to Game Theory35 Questions
Exam 2: Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games86 Questions
Exam 3: Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria32 Questions
Exam 4: Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games37 Questions
Exam 5: Finitely-Repeated, Static Games40 Questions
Exam 6: Mixing Pure Strategies51 Questions
Exam 7: Static Games With Continuous Strategies24 Questions
Exam 8: Imperfect Competition52 Questions
Exam 9: Perfect Competition and Monopoly33 Questions
Exam 10: Strategic Trade Policy35 Questions
Exam 11: Dynamic Games With Complete47 Questions
Exam 12: Bargaining54 Questions
Exam 13: Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs65 Questions
Exam 14: Torts and Contracts45 Questions
Exam 15: Auctions44 Questions
Exam 16: Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information34 Questions
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-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.5, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(86)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.9, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?
(Multiple Choice)
5.0/5
(92)
Suppose that the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopts a diligent strategy is $2. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $30. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.1. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.05 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.01. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a strict-liability-with-contributory-negligence tort law regime is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(72)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.1, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(77)
A lender has to decide whether to extend a $100 loan in exchange for a promise by the borrower to repay the loan and 10 percent simple interest in one year. The borrower plans to invest the proceeds of the loan with a certain 11 percent rate of return. The lender believes there is a 95 percent chance that the loan will be repaid. If the lender moves first, the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(76)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.7, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(65)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.4, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(81)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.1, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(86)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.10. in the text If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(81)
-Consider Figure the game depicted in 14.5, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(73)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.3, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(59)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.9, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(80)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.8, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(78)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.12. If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(75)
A contract:
I. Is a written or oral agreement between two or more parties to render a service in exchange for something of value.
II. May be enforceable in the courts if a party fails to abide by some or all of its terms and conditions.
III. Is always a written and prepared by lawyers.
Which of the following is correct?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(88)
Suppose that the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopts a diligent strategy is $2. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $30. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.1. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.05 chance that an accident willoccur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.01. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a pure-strict-liability tort law regime is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(65)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.2, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
5.0/5
(80)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.10. If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(76)
-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.13. in the text If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The payoffs from alternative strategy profiles suggest that the prevailing tort law regime is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(70)
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