Exam 14: Torts and Contracts

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.3, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?

Tort law deals with:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.8, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?

Suppose that the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopts a diligent strategy is $2. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $30. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.1. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.05 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.01. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a no-liability tort law regime is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.4, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.12. If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The payoffs from alternative strategy profiles suggest that the prevailing tort law regime is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.7, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

_____ is created largely by judges as a by-product of deciding cases is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.10. If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The payoffs from alternative strategy profiles suggest that the prevailing tort law regime is:

Common law in the U.S. is created by:

s -Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.6, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?

Suppose that the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopts a diligent strategy is $2. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $30. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.1. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.05 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.01. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a negligence-with-contributory-negligence tort law regime is:

Torts are:

Suppose that in the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopt a diligent strategy is $10. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $100. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.40. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.35 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.25. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a negligence-with-contributory- negligence tort law regime?

Tort law is concerned with the:

Suppose that in the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopt a diligent strategy is $10. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $100. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.40. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.35 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.25. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a no-liability tort law regime?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.11. If a motorist hits a pedestrian, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $50. The cost of being diligent for both players is $5. If both players are diligent, the probability that an accident will occur is 5 percent. The payoffs from alternative strategy profiles suggest that the prevailing tort law regime is:

Liability refers to:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 14.2, which summarizes the payoffs to a tortfeasor and an injured person resulting from an act of negligence. This situation most likely represents which of the following tort law regimes?

Suppose that in the cost of avoiding an accident if a motorist and pedestrian adopt a diligent strategy is $10. If an accident occurs, the pedestrian incurs accident costs of $100. If both players adopt a negligent strategy, the probability of an accident is 0.40. If either player adopts a diligent strategy, there is 0.35 chance that an accident will occur. If both players adopt a diligent strategy, the probability that an accident will occur is 0.25. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for a strict-liability-with-contributory- negligence tort law regime?