Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part A
Exam 1: Budget Constraint-Part A59 Questions
Exam 1: Budget Constraint-Part B35 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences-Part A49 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences-Part B30 Questions
Exam 3: Utility-Part A57 Questions
Exam 3: Utility-Part B30 Questions
Exam 4: Choice-Part A64 Questions
Exam 4: Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 5: Demand-Part A80 Questions
Exam 5: Demand-Part B36 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference-Part A58 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference-Part B26 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation-Part A51 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation-Part B30 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling-Part A75 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling-Part B30 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice-Part A61 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets-Part A46 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets-Part B30 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty-Part A39 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty-Part B24 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets-Part A16 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets-Part B10 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus-Part A42 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus-Part B30 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand-Part A101 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand-Part B25 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium-Part A48 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium-Part B20 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions-Part A36 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions-Part B25 Questions
Exam 17: Technology-Part A52 Questions
Exam 17: Technology-Part B30 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization-Part A53 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization-Part B21 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization-Part A78 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization-Part B26 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves-Part A53 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves-Part B25 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply-Part A46 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply-Part B15 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply-Part A49 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply-Part B33 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly-Part A76 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly-Part B35 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior-Part A34 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior-Part B20 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets-Part A24 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets-Part B20 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part A55 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part B25 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory-Part A34 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory-Part B25 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications-Part A34 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications-Part B25 Questions
Exam 29: Behavioral Economics34 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange-Part A72 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange-Part B30 Questions
Exam 31: Production-Part A35 Questions
Exam 31: Production-Part B25 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare-Part A27 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare-Part B25 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities-Part A42 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities-Part B25 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology-Part A24 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology-Part B15 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods-Part A26 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods-Part B15 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information-Part A31 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information-Part B20 Questions
Select questions type
North Bend currently has one McDonald's fast-food franchise.Demand for hamburgers in North Bend is given by Q = 400 - 10P.Any McDonald's franchise has costs of C = 60 + 3Q for producing Q hamburgers.If a second McDonald's franchise were to move into North Bend (and both behaved as duopolists), the profit of the original McDonald's would fall from
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(85)
Roach Motors is the dominant used-car dealer in a small Midwestern city.After paying $50,000 for overhead, Roach Motors' cost per car is $500.There are 4 other small used-car lots in this town, but since they are not large enough to purchase cars through the same discount sources as Roach, each firm faces the cost function C = 5,000 + 700Q + 5Q2.The demand for used cars is Q = 300 - P1/10.Assuming Roach sets the market price so as to maximize its profit, how many cars will each of the follower firms supply?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(81)
An industry has two firms each of which produces output at a constant unit cost of $10 per unit.The demand function for the industry is q = 1,000,000/p.The Cournot equilibrium price for this industry is
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(86)
An industry has two colluding firms that act so as to maximize total profit in the industry and then split the profits equally.Firm 1 has cost function c( y)= 8y.Firm 2 has cost function c( y)= y2.Each firm produces an integer number of units.Market demand is given by Y( p)= 72 - p.
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(81)
An industry has two firms-a Stackelberg leader and a follower.The price of the industry output is given by P = 84 - Q, where Q is the total output of the two firms.The follower has a marginal cost of $0.The leader has a marginal cost of $21.How much should the leader produce in order to maximize profits?
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(84)
An industry has two firms-a Stackelberg leader and a follower.The price of the industry output is given by P = 36 - Q, where Q is the total output of the two firms.The follower has a marginal cost of $0.The leader has a marginal cost of $9.How much should the leader produce in order to maximize profits?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(90)
An industry has two firms.Firm 1's cost function is c(y)= 2y +500 and firm 2's cost function is c(y)= 2y + 400.The demand curve for the output of this industry is a downward-sloping straight line.In a Cournot equilibrium, where both firms produce positive amounts of output,
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(79)
One unit of zinc and one unit of copper are needed to produce a unit of brass.The world's supply of zinc and the world's supply of copper are owned by two different monopolists.For simplicity assume that it costs nothing to mine zinc and copper, that no other inputs are needed to produce brass, and that the brass industry operates competitively.Then the price of a unit of brass equals the cost of the inputs used to make it.The demand function for brass is q = 900 - 2p, where p is the price of brass.The zinc and copper monopolists each set a price, believing that the other monopolist will not change its price.What is the equilibrium price of brass?
(Multiple Choice)
5.0/5
(85)
The duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 8,200 - 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(72)
Suppose that the inverse demand for bean sprouts is given by P(Y)= 750 -2Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm is TC(Y)= 30Y.If the industry consists of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production is
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(78)
In the Bertrand model of duopoly, each firm sets its price, believing that the other's price will not change.When both firms have identical production functions and produce with constant returns to scale, the Bertrand equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost.
(True/False)
4.8/5
(79)
A certain type of mushroom used to be produced on 50 farms, each of which had a cost function c(y)= y2 + 1, where y > 0 and c(0)= 0.The firms operated as competitors.The demand curve for this kind of mushroom is given by D(p)= 52 - p.Marauding deviant Ninja turtles invaded many of the mushroom farms leaving absolute devastation and loathsome slime in their wake.(The turtles had no effect on the cost functions of farms that were not invaded.)
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(75)
A duopoly faces the inverse demand curve p = 160 - 2q.Firm 1's total cost function is given by C1(q1)= 8q1 and firm 2's total cost function is given by C2(q2)=0 10q2.In a Cournot equilibrium,
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(82)
There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 3,600 - 4q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)= q2i, where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(86)
The duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 2,200 - 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $1.50 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(75)
Showing 41 - 55 of 55
Filters
- Essay(0)
- Multiple Choice(0)
- Short Answer(0)
- True False(0)
- Matching(0)