Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part B
Exam 1: Budget Constraint-Part A59 Questions
Exam 1: Budget Constraint-Part B35 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences-Part A49 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences-Part B30 Questions
Exam 3: Utility-Part A57 Questions
Exam 3: Utility-Part B30 Questions
Exam 4: Choice-Part A64 Questions
Exam 4: Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 5: Demand-Part A80 Questions
Exam 5: Demand-Part B36 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference-Part A58 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference-Part B26 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation-Part A51 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation-Part B30 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling-Part A75 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling-Part B30 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice-Part A61 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets-Part A46 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets-Part B30 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty-Part A39 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty-Part B24 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets-Part A16 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets-Part B10 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus-Part A42 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus-Part B30 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand-Part A101 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand-Part B25 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium-Part A48 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium-Part B20 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions-Part A36 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions-Part B25 Questions
Exam 17: Technology-Part A52 Questions
Exam 17: Technology-Part B30 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization-Part A53 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization-Part B21 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization-Part A78 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization-Part B26 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves-Part A53 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves-Part B25 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply-Part A46 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply-Part B15 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply-Part A49 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply-Part B33 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly-Part A76 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly-Part B35 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior-Part A34 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior-Part B20 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets-Part A24 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets-Part B20 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part A55 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part B25 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory-Part A34 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory-Part B25 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications-Part A34 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications-Part B25 Questions
Exam 29: Behavioral Economics34 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange-Part A72 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange-Part B30 Questions
Exam 31: Production-Part A35 Questions
Exam 31: Production-Part B25 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare-Part A27 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare-Part B25 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities-Part A42 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities-Part B25 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology-Part A24 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology-Part B15 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods-Part A26 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods-Part B15 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information-Part A31 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information-Part B20 Questions
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Suppose that the duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 16,800 - 800P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $1 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is RC (Qs)=
Free
(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
C
suppose that two Cournot duopolists serve the Peoria-Dubuque route, and the demand curve for tickets per day is Q = 240 - 2p (so p = 120 - Q/2).Total costs of running a flight on this route are 900 + 30q, where q is the number of passengers on the flight.Each flight has a capacity of 80 passengers.In Cournot equilibrium, each duopolist will run one flight per day and will make a daily profit of
Free
(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
B
suppose that two Cournot duopolists serve the Peoria-Dubuque route, and the demand curve for tickets per day is Q = 160 - 2p (so p = 80 - Q/2).Total costs of running a flight on this route are 400 + 20q, where q is the number of passengers on the flight.Each flight has a capacity of 80 passengers.In Cournot equilibrium, each duopolist will run one flight per day and will make a daily profit of
Free
(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
B
Suppose that the duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 8,400 - 800P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is RC (Qs)=
(Multiple Choice)
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There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 4,500 - 4q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)= q2i, where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose that the duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 1,800 - 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is RC (Qs)=
(Multiple Choice)
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If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 550 - 3Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)= 10Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be
(Multiple Choice)
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suppose that Grinch and Grubb go into the wine business in a small country where wine is difficult to grow.The demand for wine is given by p = $420 - .2Q, where p is the price and Q is the total quantity sold.The industry consists of just the two Cournot duopolists, Grinch and Grubb.Imports are prohibited.Grinch has constant marginal costs of $60 and Grubb has marginal costs of $30.How much Grinch's output in equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
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suppose that two Cournot duopolists serve the Peoria-Dubuque route, and the demand curve for tickets per day is Q = 170 - 2p (so p = 85 - Q/2).Total costs of running a flight on this route are 850 + 10q, where q is the number of passengers on the flight.Each flight has a capacity of 80 passengers.In Cournot equilibrium, each duopolist will run one flight per day and will make a daily profit of
(Multiple Choice)
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suppose that Grinch and Grubb go into the wine business in a small country where wine is difficult to grow.The demand for wine is given by p = $360 -.2Q, where p is the price and Q is the total quantity sold.The industry consists of just the two Cournot duopolists, Grinch and Grubb.Imports are prohibited.Grinch has constant marginal costs of $45 and Grubb has marginal costs of $15.How much Grinch's output in equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose that the duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 16,800 -800P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $1 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is RC (Qs)=
(Multiple Choice)
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There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 4,500 - 4q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)= q2i, where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if
(Multiple Choice)
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If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 430 - 2Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)= 10Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be
(Multiple Choice)
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There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 1,500 - 2q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)=q2i, where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if
(Multiple Choice)
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suppose that Grinch and Grubb go into the wine business in a small country where wine is difficult to grow.The demand for wine is given by p = $360 - .2Q, where p is the price and Q is the total quantity sold.The industry consists of just the two Cournot duopolists, Grinch and Grubb.Imports are prohibited.Grinch has constant marginal costs of $75 and Grubb has marginal costs of $15.How much Grinch's output in equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose that the duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 16,400 - 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $1 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is RC (Qs)=
(Multiple Choice)
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suppose that two Cournot duopolists serve the Peoria-Dubuque route, and the demand curve for tickets per day is Q = 250 - 2p (so p = 125 - Q/2).Total costs of running a flight on this route are 2,050 + 20q, where q is the number of passengers on the flight.Each flight has a capacity of 80 passengers.In Cournot equilibrium, each duopolist will run one flight per day and will make a daily profit of
(Multiple Choice)
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There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 3,000 - 2q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)= q2i, where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if
(Multiple Choice)
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If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 300 - 3Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)= 30Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be
(Multiple Choice)
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suppose that Grinch and Grubb go into the wine business in a small country where wine is difficult to grow.The demand for wine is given by p = $480 - .2Q, where p is the price and Q is the total quantity sold.The industry consists of just the two Cournot duopolists, Grinch and Grubb.Imports are prohibited.Grinch has constant marginal costs of $6 and Grubb has marginal costs of $45.How much Grinch's output in equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
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