There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 6,600 - 5q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)= q2i, where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if

A) and only if each firm produces 300 units in its plant. B) they produce a total of 600 units, no matter which firm produces them. C) and only if they each produce a total of 660 units. D) they produce a total of 440 units, no matter which firm produces them. E) they shut down one of the two plants, having the other operate as a monopoly and splitting the profits. A) and only if each firm produces 300 units in its plant. B) they produce a total of 600 units, no matter which firm produces them. C) and only if they each produce a total of 660 units. D) they produce a total of 440 units, no matter which firm produces them. E) they shut down one of the two plants, having the other operate as a monopoly and splitting the profits.

Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part B

If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 640 - 3Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)= 10Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 21

There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p = 6,600 - 5q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(q_i)= q²i, where q_i is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 22

If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 940 - 5Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)=40Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 23

suppose that two Cournot duopolists serve the Peoria-Dubuque route, and the demand curve for tickets per day is Q = 190 - 2p (so p = 95 - Q/2).Total costs of running a flight on this route are 1,050 + 20q, where q is the number of passengers on the flight.Each flight has a capacity of 80 passengers.In Cournot equilibrium, each duopolist will run one flight per day and will make a daily profit of

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 24

suppose that Grinch and Grubb go into the wine business in a small country where wine is difficult to grow.The demand for wine is given by p = $480 - .2Q, where p is the price and Q is the total quantity sold.The industry consists of just the two Cournot duopolists, Grinch and Grubb.Imports are prohibited.Grinch has constant marginal costs of $30 and Grubb has marginal costs of $45.How much Grinch's output in equilibrium?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 25

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Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part B

If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 640 - 3Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)= 10Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be

If the inverse demand for bean sprouts were given by P(Y)= 940 - 5Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm were TC(Y)=40Y and if the industry consisted of two Cournot duopolists, then in equilibrium each firm's production would be

Budget Constraint-Part A

Budget Constraint-Part B

Preferences-Part A

Preferences-Part B

Utility-Part A

Utility-Part B

Choice-Part A

Choice-Part B

Demand-Part A

Demand-Part B

Revealed Preference-Part A

Revealed Preference-Part B

Slutsky Equation-Part A

Slutsky Equation-Part B

Buying and Selling-Part A

Buying and Selling-Part B

Intertemporal Choice-Part A

Intertemporal Choice-Part B

Asset Markets-Part A

Asset Markets-Part B

Uncertainty-Part A

Uncertainty-Part B

Risky Assets-Part A

Risky Assets-Part B

Consumers Surplus-Part A

Consumers Surplus-Part B

Market Demand-Part A

Market Demand-Part B

Equilibrium-Part A

Equilibrium-Part B

Auctions-Part A

Auctions-Part B

Technology-Part A

Technology-Part B

Profit Maximization-Part A

Profit Maximization-Part B

Cost Minimization-Part A

Cost Minimization-Part B

Cost Curves-Part A

Cost Curves-Part B

Firm Supply-Part A

Firm Supply-Part B

Industry Supply-Part A

Industry Supply-Part B

Monopoly-Part A

Monopoly-Part B

Monopoly Behavior-Part A

Monopoly Behavior-Part B

Factor Markets-Part A

Factor Markets-Part B

Oligopoly-Part A

Game Theory-Part A

Game Theory-Part B

Game Applications-Part A

Game Applications-Part B

Behavioral Economics

Exchange-Part A

Exchange-Part B

Production-Part A

Production-Part B

Welfare-Part A

Welfare-Part B

Externalities-Part A

Externalities-Part B

Information Technology-Part A

Information Technology-Part B

Public Goods-Part A

Public Goods-Part B

Asymmetric Information-Part A

Asymmetric Information-Part B

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