Exam 13: Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
Exam 1: Introduction60 Questions
Exam 2: Supply and Demand151 Questions
Exam 3: Applying the Supply-And-Demand Model124 Questions
Exam 4: Consumer Choice125 Questions
Exam 5: Applying Consumer Theory118 Questions
Exam 6: Firms and Production128 Questions
Exam 7: Costs124 Questions
Exam 8: Competitive Firms and Markets127 Questions
Exam 9: Applying the Competitive Model156 Questions
Exam 10: General Equilibrium and Economic Welfare122 Questions
Exam 11: Monopoly147 Questions
Exam 12: Pricing and Advertising135 Questions
Exam 13: Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition128 Questions
Exam 14: Game Theory109 Questions
Exam 15: Factor Markets103 Questions
Exam 16: Interest Rates, Investments, and Capital Markets120 Questions
Exam 17: Uncertainty122 Questions
Exam 18: Externalities, Open-Access, and Public Goods123 Questions
Exam 19: Asymmetric Information119 Questions
Exam 20: Contracts and Moral Hazards107 Questions
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In a monopolistically competitive market,the lower the firms' fixed costs,
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Two identical firms that share a market and produce a homogenous good will find the Bertrand Oligopoly LEAST attractive because
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Which of the following is a necessary condition for government subsidies to influence a firm to choose an output level as if it were a Stackelberg leader?
(Multiple Choice)
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-The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated town.The perfect competitive outcome is that
(Multiple Choice)
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If only two identical firms operate in a market,consumers prefer
(Multiple Choice)
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Monopolistically competitive firms face downward-sloping residual demand curves because these firms
(Multiple Choice)
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There are only two firms in an industry with demand curves q1 = 30 - P and q2 = 30 - P.Both have no fixed costs and each has a marginal cost of 10 per unit produced.If they behave as profit-maximizing price takers,each produces 20 units and sells them at a price of 10 so that each firm makes zero economic profits.If they formed a cartel and split the production of the output evenly,the profit-maximizing quantity produced by each firm is
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose the demand for pizza in a small isolated town is p = 10 - Q.The only two firms,A and B,behave as Cournot duopolists.Each has a cost function TC = 2 + Q.If the government wants to subsidize firm A to raise its output to that of a Stackelberg leader,how large should the subsidy be?
(Essay)
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There are only two firms in an industry with demand curves q1 = 30 - P and q2 = 30 - P.Both have no fixed costs and each has a marginal cost of 10 per unit produced.If they behave as profit-maximizing price takers,each produces 20 units and sells them at a price of 10 so that each firm makes zero economic profits.Suppose the two firms form a cartel.While firm 1 produces one-half of the profit-maximizing cartel output,firm 2 cheats and produces 5 units more.What would happen to the two firms' economic profits?
(Multiple Choice)
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The Bertrand model is a more plausible model of firm behavior than the Cournot model
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose the demand for Pepsi-Cola is qp = 50 - 2pp + 1pc.The firm faces a constant marginal cost of m,and pc denotes the price of Coca-Cola.Assuming Bertrand behavior,derive Pepsi-Cola's best-response function and explain how the firm changes price in response to changes in its own marginal cost and changes in Coca-Cola's price.
(Essay)
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As compared to the basic Nash-Cournot equilibrium for duopolists where the firms face the same market demand curve and have identical costs,in the situation where the firms produce products which are viewed by consumers as not being identical,
(Multiple Choice)
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What happens in a duopoly if both firms try to act as the Stackelberg leader?
(Essay)
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Suppose the demand for pizza in a small isolated town is p = 10 - Q.There are only two firms,A and B.Each has a cost function TC = 2 + Q.Determine the equilibrium quantities of each if firm A is the Stackelberg leader.
(Essay)
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Suppose Cournot duopolists firms (A and B) face the same market demand curve, and initially have identical costs. Firm A figures out a way of reducing its marginal cost. At the new Nash-Cournot equilibrium,
(Multiple Choice)
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-The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated town.The Cournot equilibrium is at point
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose that government used to requires airline companies to have at least 30 airplanes and serve at least 20 different airports.Now,this requirement changed to a minimum of 10 airplanes and 4 different airports.Such change in regulation will lead to
(Multiple Choice)
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