Exam 13: Strategic Games

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Bratty Brad and Mousey Mike are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Bratty Brad can hit Mousey Mike or not and Mousey Mike can tattle on Bratty Brad or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Bratty Brad hits Mousey Mike,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Mousey Mike a bruise,a loss of 5 but Bratty Brad gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,Mousey Mike gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brad loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​If Mousey Mike threatens to tell,what would Bratty Brad's best response be?

​Which one of the following is a way to get out of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Nash Equilibrium?

​Which one of the following is a way to get out of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Nash Equilibrium?

Which one of the following is a way to get out of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Nash Equilibrium?

​Use the following case from question A couple gets into an argument deciding where they would go out together.Both like to spend like with each other and have the payoffs as below -​If Sally decides to go to the boxing match,what is Sam's best response

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Bratty Brad and Mousey Mike are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Bratty Brad can hit Mousey Mike or not and Mousey Mike can tattle on Bratty Brad or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Bratty Brad hits Mousey Mike,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Mousey Mike a bruise,a loss of 5 but Bratty Brad gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,Mousey Mike gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brad loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​If Mousey Mike tattles,what would Bratty Brad's best response be

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Bratty Brad and Mousey Mike are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Bratty Brad can hit Mousey Mike or not and Mousey Mike can tattle on Bratty Brad or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Bratty Brad hits Mousey Mike,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Mousey Mike a bruise,a loss of 5 but Bratty Brad gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,Mousey Mike gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brad loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​If Mousey Mike wants to not be hit,what strategy could he follow

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Sarah and Tom are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Sarah can hit Tom or not and Tom can tattle on Sarah or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Sarah hits Tom,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Tom a bruise,a loss of 5 but Sarah gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,he gets a gain of 5 and Sarah loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -If Sarah decides to hit Tom,what would Tom's best response be​

​Use the following case from question A shoplifter and a security guard are playing a simultaneous game.If the shoplifter steals and the security guard is vigilant,the shoplifter gets caught she suffers a loss of 20,and the security guard gets a bonus worth 15.If the shoplifter steals and the security guard is not vigilant,she does not get caught and gains 15 and the guard loses 5.If the shoplifter does not steal and the guard is vigilant,the guard loses 3 for the effort,while the shoplifter gains nothing and if the shoplifter does not steal and the guard is not vigilant,neither gain anything -​If the simultaneous game is instead changed into a sequential game where the shoplifter can see whether the security guard is vigilant or not before deciding to steal.What is the Nash equilibrium of the game?

​Use the following case from question A shoplifter and a security guard are playing a simultaneous game.If the shoplifter steals and the security guard is vigilant,the shoplifter gets caught she suffers a loss of 20,and the security guard gets a bonus worth 15.If the shoplifter steals and the security guard is not vigilant,she does not get caught and gains 15 and the guard loses 5.If the shoplifter does not steal and the guard is vigilant,the guard loses 3 for the effort,while the shoplifter gains nothing and if the shoplifter does not steal and the guard is not vigilant,neither gain anything -​If the security guard is somehow certain that the shoplifter would not steal,his best response would be

​Use the following case from question Two street racers are playing a simultaneous game of chicken.They have to race towards each other and whoever swerves first is chicken and faces shame,a loss of 8,while the winner enjoys a gain of 3.If neither stop,they would crash into each other,a loss of 10.If both of them swerve at the same time,they are both chicken and face a loss of 5 each -​What would the B's best response be if player A does not stop?

​Use the following to answer question Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game:  Two discount stores (megastore and superstore)are interested in expanding their market share through advertising.The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits)of both stores with and without advertising. -​What is the equilibrium payoff for the stores?

​Use the following to answer question Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game:  Two discount stores (megastore and superstore)are interested in expanding their market share through advertising.The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits)of both stores with and without advertising. -​If the stores could co-operate with each other,it would be efficient

​Corporate Buying II Nestlé's has over one hundred production facilities that all purchase hair nets and other hygienic supplies through independent suppliers.Nestlé created a centralized purchasing system that is cumbersome to use has the potential to bargain for lower prices.Suppose that each of two divisions can purchase hairnets for $8 independently.If they all purchase through the central system,hairnets cost $6.But if one division uses the system and the other purchases independently,the cost to the first is $9 while the cost to the second is $7.What does the sequential move game look like for two divisions where division 1 goes first? What is the equilibrium?

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Bratty Brad and Mousey Mike are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Bratty Brad can hit Mousey Mike or not and Mousey Mike can tattle on Bratty Brad or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Bratty Brad hits Mousey Mike,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Mousey Mike a bruise,a loss of 5 but Bratty Brad gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,Mousey Mike gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brad loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​If Bratty Brad decides to hit Mousey Mike,what would Mousey Mike's best response be

​Hire Consultants A firm and its supplier are going to negotiate a deal.Since the supplier's cost is $10 million per quarter and the value to the firm is $14 million per quarter,there is $4 million per quarter to split between the two.However,they can each hire a negotiation consultant for $500,000 per negotiation.If neither hires the consultant,each expects to get half of the $4 million pot.If only one hires the consultant,it expects to get three-fourths of the pot minus the consultant costs.If they both hire consultants,they cancel each other out and they expect to get half the pot minus the consulting costs.What is the equilibrium of this simultaneous move game?

​Use the following to answer question Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game:  Two discount stores (megastore and superstore)are interested in expanding their market share through advertising.The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits)of both stores with and without advertising. -​If the stores could co-operate,what is the new Nash equilibrium?

Use the following case from question Irene's Dairy is deciding whether or not to enter the market for ice cream,currently monopolized by Mattie's Ice-cream.If it enters the market,Mattie's can either accommodate him and share his 10million in profits equally with Irene or fight him and cause a 5million loss for each in a price war.​ -What would be the profits for Mattie's Dairy in equilibrium if Irene does enter the market?​

​In repeated games,all of the following allow a firm to escape an inefficient "prisoners dilemma" equilibrium except

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Sarah and Tom are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Sarah can hit Tom or not and Tom can tattle on Sarah or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Sarah hits Tom,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Tom a bruise,a loss of 5 but Sarah gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,he gets a gain of 5 and Sarah loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​What would be the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous game?