Exam 13: Strategic Games

​Use the following case from question Two roommates John and Joe are playing a simultaneous game of cleaning the apartment.If neither of them clean,the apartment gets filthy and both get a utility of 2.If John cleans and Joe doesn't,John gets a utility of 1 and Joe gets a utility of 4.If Joe cleans and John doesn't,Joe gets a utility of 1 and John gets a utility of 4 and if both clean up the apartment,they each get a utility of 3. -​What is the Nash equilibrium of this game?

Use the following case from question Irene's Dairy is deciding whether or not to enter the market for ice cream,currently monopolized by Mattie's Ice-cream.If it enters the market,Mattie's can either accommodate him and share his 10million in profits equally with Irene or fight him and cause a 5million loss for each in a price war.​ -​If Mattie wants to discourage Irene from entering the market,what strategy should she follow?

​Refer to the following normal form game of price competition question -​What is the Nash equilibrium of this one-shot game?

​Use the following case from question Two ice cream trucks A&B are playing a simultaneous pricing game.If one of them prices low,he gets all the customers,a payoff of 12,while other gets zero.If both price high they each get a payoff of 6 and if both price low,they get a payoff of 5. -​If the game is repeated indefinitely,and the vendors adopt a trigger strategy such that they would start charging the low price only if the other vendor charged a low price last time,what would be the Nash equilibrium?

Use the following case from question Irene's Dairy is deciding whether or not to enter the market for ice cream,currently monopolized by Mattie's Ice-cream.If it enters the market,Mattie's can either accommodate him and share his 10million in profits equally with Irene or fight him and cause a 5million loss for each in a price war.​ -​What would be the profits for Irene's Dairy in equilibrium?

​Corporate Buying I Nestlé's has over one hundred production facilities that all purchase hair nets and other hygienic supplies through independent suppliers.Nestlé created a centralized purchasing system that is cumbersome to use has the potential to bargain for lower prices.Suppose that a division can purchase hairnets for $8 independently.If they all purchase through the central system,hairnets cost $6.But if one division uses the system and the other purchases independently,the cost to the first is $9 while the cost to the second is $7.What does the simultaneous move game look like and what is the equilibrium?

​The Nash equilibrium is

​Use the following to answer question Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game:  Two discount stores (megastore and superstore)are interested in expanding their market share through advertising.The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits)of both stores with and without advertising. -​The Nash equilibrium for the game is

Use the following case from question Irene's Dairy is deciding whether or not to enter the market for ice cream,currently monopolized by Mattie's Ice-cream.If it enters the market,Mattie's can either accommodate him and share his 10million in profits equally with Irene or fight him and cause a 5million loss for each in a price war.​ -​What would the Nash equilibrium be in this sequential game?

​Use the following case from question Two ice cream trucks A&B are playing a simultaneous pricing game.If one of them prices low,he gets all the customers,a payoff of 12,while other gets zero.If both price high they each get a payoff of 6 and if both price low,they get a payoff of 5. -​What is the best response of Vendor B to Vendor A pricing high?

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Bratty Brad and Mousey Mike are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Bratty Brad can hit Mousey Mike or not and Mousey Mike can tattle on Bratty Brad or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Bratty Brad hits Mousey Mike,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Mousey Mike a bruise,a loss of 5 but Bratty Brad gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,Mousey Mike gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brad loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​What would be the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous game?

​In a tit for tat strategy players

Use the following case from question Irene's Dairy is deciding whether or not to enter the market for ice cream,currently monopolized by Mattie's Ice-cream.If it enters the market,Mattie's can either accommodate him and share his 10million in profits equally with Irene or fight him and cause a 5million loss for each in a price war.​ -​If Mattie's threatens to always fight,what would Irene's best response be?

​The equilibrium outcome used in both the sequential and simultaneous move games is known as

​Use the following case from question Two street racers are playing a simultaneous game of chicken.They have to race towards each other and whoever swerves first is chicken and faces shame,a loss of 8,while the winner enjoys a gain of 3.If neither stop,they would crash into each other,a loss of 10.If both of them swerve at the same time,they are both chicken and face a loss of 5 each -​What would the Nash equilibrium be in this game?

​Game theory assumes that players in the game act

​Use the following case from question Two siblings,Bratty Brad and Mousey Mike are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game.Bratty Brad can hit Mousey Mike or not and Mousey Mike can tattle on Bratty Brad or not.Relative to no hitting and no tattling,if Bratty Brad hits Mousey Mike,and he tattles they both experience a loss of 10.Not telling,gets Mousey Mike a bruise,a loss of 5 but Bratty Brad gains 5.If he tattles untruthfully,Mousey Mike gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brad loses 5.If they get along,no one gets anything -​If Mousey Mike does not tattle,what would Bratty Brad's best response be

Use the following case from question Irene's Dairy is deciding whether or not to enter the market for ice cream,currently monopolized by Mattie's Ice-cream.If it enters the market,Mattie's can either accommodate him and share his 10million in profits equally with Irene or fight him and cause a 5million loss for each in a price war.​ -​Given that Mattie could convincingly threatens to always fight,what would be Irene's best response

In sequential games,

​Use the following case from question A shoplifter and a security guard are playing a simultaneous game.If the shoplifter steals and the security guard is vigilant,the shoplifter gets caught she suffers a loss of 20,and the security guard gets a bonus worth 15.If the shoplifter steals and the security guard is not vigilant,she does not get caught and gains 15 and the guard loses 5.If the shoplifter does not steal and the guard is vigilant,the guard loses 3 for the effort,while the shoplifter gains nothing and if the shoplifter does not steal and the guard is not vigilant,neither gain anything -​What is the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous game?