Exam 28:Oligopoly-Part A
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The price elasticity of demand for melocotones is constant and equal to -2.The melocotone market is controlled by two Cournot duopolists who have different cost functions.One of the duopolists has a constant marginal cost of $975 per ton and produces 70% of the total number of melocotones sold.The equilibrium price of a ton of melocotones must be
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(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
A
An industry has two firms producing at a constant unit cost of $10 per unit.The inverse demand curve for the industry is p =110 - .5q.Suppose that firm 1 is a Stackelberg leader in choosing its quantity (i.e. ,firm 1 chooses its quantity first,knowing that firm 2 will observe firm 1's quantity when it chooses its own output. )How much output will firm 2,the follower,produce?
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(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
D
The inverse demand function for fuzzy dice is p = 20 - q.There are constant returns to scale in this industry with unit costs of $8.Which of the following sets of statements is completely true?
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(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
D
A duopoly in which two identical firms are engaged in Bertrand competition will not distort prices from their competitive levels.
(True/False)
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Suppose that the inverse demand for bean sprouts is given by P(Y)=750 - 2Y and the total cost of producing Y units for any firm is TC(Y)= 30Y.If the industry consists of two Cournot duopolists,then in equilibrium each firm's production is
(Multiple Choice)
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Conjectural variation refers to the fact that in a single market there is variation among firms in their estimates of the demand function in future periods.
(True/False)
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The duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q = 8,200- 400P,where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year,then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is
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Roach Motors is the dominant used-car dealer in a small Midwestern city.After paying $50,000 for overhead,Roach Motors' cost per car is $500.There are 5 other small used-car lots in this town,but since they are not large enough to purchase cars through the same discount sources as Roach,each firm faces the cost function C =5,000 + 700Q +5Q2.The demand for used cars is Q =200-P1/10.Assuming Roach is aware of its competitors' costs,what price should Roach set for a used car?
(Multiple Choice)
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A Stackelberg leader chooses his actions on the assumption that his rival will adjust to the leader's actions in such a way as to maximize the rival's profits.
(True/False)
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An industry has two firms-a Stackelberg leader and a follower.The price of the industry output is given by P = 84 - Q,where Q is the total output of the two firms.The follower has a marginal cost of $0.The leader has a marginal cost of $21.How much should the leader produce in order to maximize profits?
(Multiple Choice)
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Roach Motors is the dominant used-car dealer in a small Midwestern city.After paying $50,000 for overhead,Roach Motors' cost per car is $500.There are 4 other small used-car lots in this town,but since they are not large enough to purchase cars through the same discount sources as Roach,each firm faces the cost function C = 5,000 + 600Q +5Q2.The demand for used cars is Q = 600 -P3/10.Assuming Roach sets the market price so as to maximize its profit,how many cars will each of the follower firms supply?
(Multiple Choice)
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Consider a market with one large firm and many small firms.The supply function of all of the small firms together is S(p)=200 + p,the market demand curve is D(p)= 400 -p,and the cost function for the large firm is C(y)=20y.The residual demand curve for the large firm,where DL is the large firm's demand and yL is the large firm's output,is
(Multiple Choice)
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The duopolists Carl and Simon face a demand function for pumpkins of Q =2,200 -400P,where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins.Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $1.50 for each pumpkin produced.If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year,then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits.Carl's reaction function is
(Multiple Choice)
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Roach Motors is the dominant used-car dealer in a small Midwestern city.After paying $50,000 for overhead,Roach Motors' cost per car is $500.There are 4 other small used-car lots in this town,but since they are not large enough to purchase cars through the same discount sources as Roach,each firm faces the cost function C = 5,000 +700Q +5Q2.The demand for used cars is Q = 300 +P1/10.Assuming Roach sets the market price so as to maximize its profit,how many cars will each of the follower firms supply?
(Multiple Choice)
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There are two firms in the blastopheme industry.The demand curve for blastophemes is given by p =3,600 -4q.Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(qi)= q2i,where qi is the output of firm i.The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally.Under this cartel arrangement,they will maximize joint profits if
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An industry has two colluding firms that act so as to maximize total profit in the industry and then split the profits equally.Firm 1 has cost function c( y)= 8y.Firm 2 has cost function c( y)= y2.Each firm produces an integer number of units.Market demand is given by Y( p)= 56 - p.
(Multiple Choice)
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A duopoly faces the demand curve D(p)= 30 - .5p.Both firms in the industry have a total cost function given by C(q)= 4q.Suppose that firm 1 is a Stackelberg leader in choosing its quantity first.Firm 1's profit function can be written as
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose that the demand curve for an industry's output is a downward-sloping straight line and there is constant marginal cost.Then the larger the number of identical firms producing in Cournot equilibrium,the lower will be the price.
(True/False)
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Suppose that the price elasticity of demand for airline flights between two cities is constant and equal to -1.5.If 4 airlines with equal costs are in Cournot equilibrium for this industry,then the ratio of price to marginal cost in the industry is
(Multiple Choice)
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An industry has two firms.The inverse demand function for this industry is p = 74 -4q.Both firms produce at a constant unit cost of $26 per unit.What is the Cournot equilibrium price for this industry?
(Multiple Choice)
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