Exam 20: Contracts and Moral Hazards

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Wage reduction policies are less common than layoffs because

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Suppose a plaintiff hires a lawyer to represent her in a court case.The lawyer will receive a share of the settlement if the plaintiff wins.Under this contract,

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If a professional sports athlete signs a new contract which defers compensation until years after she is retired,she is signaling

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Explain how more than one possible state of nature affects contract choices.

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Efficiency in risk bearing implies that

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A deferred payment scheme is more likely to be accepted by a worker if

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Describe the characteristics of an efficient contract between a principal and an agent.

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Explain why a firm may hire managers to operate outlets near the firm's headquarters,but may sell franchise rights for the outlets located greater distances from the headquarters.(With a franchise,the firm sells a brand name and a method of doing business to someone who then owns and operates the outlet.)

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In the presence of asymmetric information,production efficiency is assured when the principal and agent share the profit.

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If a firm hires lazy employees,

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Workers can reduce the chance of an employer lying by

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A good salesperson can sell $200,000 worth of goods,while a poor one can sell only a smaller amount worth of goods.Job applicants know if they are good or bad,but the firm does not.A firm will offer job applicants a choice between a fixed salary of $20,000 or a 20% commission.Assume risk-neutral salespersons and no opportunistic behavior.Given that the firm wants to distinguish a prospective good salesperson from a poor one,what should be the sales amount of a poor salesperson?

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If information is asymmetric,explain why the hire contract is not efficient in production and a moral hazard exists,but the fixed fee to the principal contract is efficient and does not pose a moral hazard problem.

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Season tickets entail a certain amount of risk due to unpredictable team quality,injuries,weather,and so forth.Who is most likely to purchase season tickets?

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A good salesperson can sell $1,000,000 worth of goods,while a poor one can sell only $100,000 worth of goods.Job applicants know if they are good or bad,but the firm does not.A firm will offer job applicants a choice between a fixed salary and 20% commission.Assuming risk-neutral salespersons and no opportunistic behavior,what level must the fixed salary be so that the firm can distinguish a prospective good salesperson from a poor one,and thereby avoid hiring a poor one?

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A firm uses an efficiency wage scheme to deter workers from shirking,which is detected 10% of the times.Suppose a risk-neutral worker.The industry ongoing wage is $3,000.The efficiency wage paid by this firm is $8,000.What is this worker's reservation wage?

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In the presence of asymmetric information,a contingent contract

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In the presence of asymmetric information,a hire contract

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Sam is suing someone in court for $10,000.The probability that Sam will lose the case is 1/h where h is the number of hours that Sam's attorney works on the case.The lawyer charges $500 per hour if he is to be paid hourly,or he requests 20% of the settlement if he is to be paid on a contingency basis.Assuming both Sam and the attorney are risk-neutral wealth maximizers,is either contract efficient?

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Under deferred compensation packages,

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