Question 1

In the nonstrategic view of bargaining

Accepted Answer

A) Insights are drawn from how many similar games are played without specifying the strategies 
B) We use the fact that bargaining often results in a fifty-fifty split 
C) The bargain is affected by the parties' disagreement values 
D) All of the above 
A) Insights are drawn from how many similar games are played without specifying the strategies 
B) We use the fact that bargaining often results in a fifty-fifty split 
C) The bargain is affected by the parties' disagreement values 
D) All of the above D

Question 2

Unless you accept his 'final offer' your negotiation opponent threatens to scrap the whole deal:

Accepted Answer

A) His threat is more believable if both parties would be harmed by scrapping the deal 
B) His threat is more believable if he has invested resources that lower his return to other options 
C) His threat is more believable if he puts his threat 'in writing' 
D) His threat is more believable if he has balked at this course of action in the past 
A) His threat is more believable if both parties would be harmed by scrapping the deal 
B) His threat is more believable if he has invested resources that lower his return to other options 
C) His threat is more believable if he puts his threat 'in writing' 
D) His threat is more believable if he has balked at this course of action in the past B

Question 3

In the strategic view of bargaining:

Accepted Answer

A) Bargaining is described by an explicit game 
B) Insights are drawn from how many similar games are played without specifying the strategies 
C) We use the fact that bargaining often results in a fifty-fifty split 
D) It is important to limit your opponent's disagreement value 
A) Bargaining is described by an explicit game 
B) Insights are drawn from how many similar games are played without specifying the strategies 
C) We use the fact that bargaining often results in a fifty-fifty split 
D) It is important to limit your opponent's disagreement value A

Question 4

In the labor negotiation game:

Accepted Answer

A) Neither party prefers bargaining hard 
B) Neither party prefers accommodating the other 
C) Both parties bargain hard in the Nash equilibrium 
D) Neither party knows what the equilibrium will be. 
A) Neither party prefers bargaining hard 
B) Neither party prefers accommodating the other 
C) Both parties bargain hard in the Nash equilibrium 
D) Neither party knows what the equilibrium will be.

Question 5

Which of the following will improve your salary bargaining position

Accepted Answer

A) The product your team produces has become more costly to produce 
B) New firms have entered with competing products for the one your team produces 
C) Your competitors have developed new products that contain more of the features that your team produces 
D) There are fewer close substitutes for the product your team supports 
A) The product your team produces has become more costly to produce 
B) New firms have entered with competing products for the one your team produces 
C) Your competitors have developed new products that contain more of the features that your team produces 
D) There are fewer close substitutes for the product your team supports

Question 6

The disagreement value in a nonstrategic game is most closely related to

Accepted Answer

A) opportunity costs 
B) fixed costs 
C) total profit 
D) accounting costs 
A) opportunity costs 
B) fixed costs 
C) total profit 
D) accounting costs

Question 7

The reason we study the sequential labor negotiation game:

Accepted Answer

A) Is to show that these games usually go on for rounds and rounds 
B) Is to show the importance of the first mover being able to commit to an offer 
C) Is to show the importance of the second mover being able to commit to an offer 
D) Is to show the problems of prisoners dilemmas 
A) Is to show that these games usually go on for rounds and rounds 
B) Is to show the importance of the first mover being able to commit to an offer 
C) Is to show the importance of the second mover being able to commit to an offer 
D) Is to show the problems of prisoners dilemmas

Question 8

Which of the following will improve your supplier contracting bargaining position

Accepted Answer

A) You have a policy of always excluding at least one potential competing supplier 
B) You have a policy of increasing product options by never excluding a potential supplier 
C) Two of your suppliers merge 
D) Your final product that includes this component becomes more profitable 
A) You have a policy of always excluding at least one potential competing supplier 
B) You have a policy of increasing product options by never excluding a potential supplier 
C) Two of your suppliers merge 
D) Your final product that includes this component becomes more profitable

Question 9

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

Accepted Answer

A) shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived 
B) shopping when the showroom is full of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has few cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the end of the month 
A) shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived 
B) shopping when the showroom is full of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has few cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the end of the month

Question 10

In the labor negotiation game:

Accepted Answer

A) The payoffs from bargaining hard are only higher if your opponent accommodates 
B) The payoffs from bargaining hard are only higher if your opponent bargains hard 
C) The payoffs are always higher if you bargain hard 
D) The payoffs are always higher if your opponent bargains hard 
A) The payoffs from bargaining hard are only higher if your opponent accommodates 
B) The payoffs from bargaining hard are only higher if your opponent bargains hard 
C) The payoffs are always higher if you bargain hard 
D) The payoffs are always higher if your opponent bargains hard

Question 11

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

Accepted Answer

A) shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived 
B) shopping when the showroom is full of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has many cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the beginning of the month 
A) shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived 
B) shopping when the showroom is full of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has many cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the beginning of the month

Question 12

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

Accepted Answer

A) shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived 
B) shopping when the showroom is empty of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has few cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the beginning of the month 
A) shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived 
B) shopping when the showroom is empty of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has few cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the beginning of the month

Question 13

In the strategic view of bargaining:

Accepted Answer

A) You want to improve your opponent's outside options 
B) You want to decrease your outside options 
C) Bargaining is of a prisoner's dilemma game 
D) Bargaining is of a game of 'chicken' 
A) You want to improve your opponent's outside options 
B) You want to decrease your outside options 
C) Bargaining is of a prisoner's dilemma game 
D) Bargaining is of a game of 'chicken'

Question 14

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

Accepted Answer

A) shopping for last year's model when the new model year cars are arriving 
B) shopping when the showroom is full of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has few cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the beginning of the month 
A) shopping for last year's model when the new model year cars are arriving 
B) shopping when the showroom is full of customers 
C) shopping when the car lot has few cars left unsold 
D) shopping toward the beginning of the month

Question 15

Which of the following will improve your salary bargaining position

Accepted Answer

A) Wait until the large project you were integral to is completed 
B) Wait until your employer has hired many others with similar skills as yours' 
C) Wait until your employer has invested greatly into the long-term project you lead 
D) At the very outset of a project that you will lead 
A) Wait until the large project you were integral to is completed 
B) Wait until your employer has hired many others with similar skills as yours' 
C) Wait until your employer has invested greatly into the long-term project you lead 
D) At the very outset of a project that you will lead

Question 16

To improve your own bargaining position

Accepted Answer

A) have low valued outside options 
B) increase the value of outside options 
C) do not alter the value of your outside options 
D) increase the value of your opponent's outside options 
A) have low valued outside options 
B) increase the value of outside options 
C) do not alter the value of your outside options 
D) increase the value of your opponent's outside options

Question 17

Which of the following will improve your supplier contracting bargaining position

Accepted Answer

A) Your supplier merges with an alternative supplier 
B) You redesign your component requirements to be more flexible across different potential suppliers 
C) You redesign your component requirements so that your preferred supplier is more integral to product success 
D) Your supplier's chief competitor has exited the market 
A) Your supplier merges with an alternative supplier 
B) You redesign your component requirements to be more flexible across different potential suppliers 
C) You redesign your component requirements so that your preferred supplier is more integral to product success 
D) Your supplier's chief competitor has exited the market

Question 18

In the sequential labor negotiation game:

Accepted Answer

A) The ability to commit to a strategy gives you an advantage 
B) The ability to commit to a strategy gives your opponent an advantage 
C) The ability to commit to a strategy is irrelevant 
D) Players should simply state their desire to commit to a strategy to obtain an advantage 
A) The ability to commit to a strategy gives you an advantage 
B) The ability to commit to a strategy gives your opponent an advantage 
C) The ability to commit to a strategy is irrelevant 
D) Players should simply state their desire to commit to a strategy to obtain an advantage

Question 19

In the sequential negotiation games:

Accepted Answer

A) You can induce a change in the strategy in your opponent only if your threat is believed 
B) Any threat can induce a change in strategy in your opponent 
C) A threat that is believed is one that you will not have to carry out 
D) A and C 
A) You can induce a change in the strategy in your opponent only if your threat is believed 
B) Any threat can induce a change in strategy in your opponent 
C) A threat that is believed is one that you will not have to carry out 
D) A and C

Question 20

In the sequential labor negotiation game:

Accepted Answer

A) The first mover has an advantage 
B) The second mover has an advantage 
C) There is no advantage to either mover 
D) none of the above 
A) The first mover has an advantage 
B) The second mover has an advantage 
C) There is no advantage to either mover 
D) none of the above

Exam 16: Bargaining

In the nonstrategic view of bargaining

Unless you accept his 'final offer' your negotiation opponent threatens to scrap the whole deal:

In the strategic view of bargaining:

In the labor negotiation game:

Which of the following will improve your salary bargaining position

The disagreement value in a nonstrategic game is most closely related to

The reason we study the sequential labor negotiation game:

Which of the following will improve your supplier contracting bargaining position

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

In the labor negotiation game:

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

In the strategic view of bargaining:

When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by

Which of the following will improve your salary bargaining position

To improve your own bargaining position

Which of the following will improve your supplier contracting bargaining position

In the sequential labor negotiation game:

In the sequential negotiation games:

In the sequential labor negotiation game:

The One Lessor of Business

Benefits, Costs, and Decisions

Extent How Muchdecisions

Investment Decisions: Look Ahead and Reason Back

Simple Pricing

Economies of Scale and Scope

Understanding Markets and Industry Changes

Market Structure and Long-Run Equilibrium

Strategy: the Quest to Keep Profit From Eroding

Foreign Exchange, trade, and Bubbles

More Realistic and Complex Pricing

Direct Price Discrimination Indirect Price Discrimination

Strategic Games

Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Auctions

The Problem of Adverse Selection

The Problem of Moral Hazard

Getting Employees to Work in the Firms Best Interest

Getting Divisions to Work in the Firms Best Interest

Managing Vertical Relationships

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