Question 1

In an indefinitely repeated game, a firm might use a ________ to ________ a rival that defects from a cooperative strategy.

Accepted Answer

A) trigger strategy; threaten 
B) trigger strategy; punish 
C) legal maneuver; sue 
D) tacit threat; dissuade 
A) trigger strategy; threaten 
B) trigger strategy; punish 
C) legal maneuver; sue 
D) tacit threat; dissuade

Question 2

In a repeated game, deterring entry

Accepted Answer

A) is not possible. 
B) is not a rational strategy if money is lost fighting the first potential entrant. 
C) may require losing money fighting the first potential entrant. 
D) cannot form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
A) is not possible. 
B) is not a rational strategy if money is lost fighting the first potential entrant. 
C) may require losing money fighting the first potential entrant. 
D) cannot form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Question 3

If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output

Accepted Answer

A) it becomes the leader. 
B) the other firm does not view the announcement as credible. 
C) the other firm will shut down. 
D) the other firm will double output also. 
A) it becomes the leader. 
B) the other firm does not view the announcement as credible. 
C) the other firm will shut down. 
D) the other firm will double output also.

Question 4

In the ultimatum game, one reason players don't choose the rational offer is

Accepted Answer

A) that there are too many possible outcomes to reasonably consider. 
B) they are worse off by taking the offer. 
C) most people believe in reciprocity, and will therefore get even if the prosper treats them badly. 
D) that it is not a Nash equilibrium. 
A) that there are too many possible outcomes to reasonably consider. 
B) they are worse off by taking the offer. 
C) most people believe in reciprocity, and will therefore get even if the prosper treats them badly. 
D) that it is not a Nash equilibrium.

Question 5

In a dynamic game, rational players

Accepted Answer

A) will reject outcomes that are not subgame perfect. 
B) use backward induction to determine best responses. 
C) have strategies that select a Nash equilibrium in the game as a whole. 
D) All of the above. 
A) will reject outcomes that are not subgame perfect. 
B) use backward induction to determine best responses. 
C) have strategies that select a Nash equilibrium in the game as a whole. 
D) All of the above.

Question 6

In a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game

Accepted Answer

A) firms will only cooperate if they each adopt a tit-for-tat strategy. 
B) firms cooperate and achieve the collusive Nash equilibrium for all rounds. 
C) firms cooperate for most of the rounds, but switch to the non-cooperative outcome in the final couple of rounds. 
D) firms do not cooperate and the static game Nash equilibrium is the outcome for each round. 
A) firms will only cooperate if they each adopt a tit-for-tat strategy. 
B) firms cooperate and achieve the collusive Nash equilibrium for all rounds. 
C) firms cooperate for most of the rounds, but switch to the non-cooperative outcome in the final couple of rounds. 
D) firms do not cooperate and the static game Nash equilibrium is the outcome for each round.

Question 7

A an example of a game in which a leader moves first, and then the other rivals follow is a ________ game.

Accepted Answer

A) Stackelberg model 
B) Cournot model 
C) finite move 
D) tit-for-tat 
A) Stackelberg model 
B) Cournot model 
C) finite move 
D) tit-for-tat

In an indefinitely repeated game, a firm might use a to a rival that defects from a cooperative strategy.

In a repeated game, deterring entry

If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output

In the ultimatum game, one reason players don't choose the rational offer is

In a dynamic game, rational players

In a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game

A an example of a game in which a leader moves first, and then the other rivals follow is a ________ game.

Introduction

Supply and Demand

Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis

Consumer Choice

Production

Costs

Firm Organization and Market Structure

Competitive Firms and Markets

Monopoly

Pricing With Market Power

Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition

Game Theory and Business Strategy

Managerial Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Asymmetric Information

Government and Business

Global Business

Filters

Exam 13: Strategies Over Time

In an indefinitely repeated game, a firm might use a ________ to ________ a rival that defects from a cooperative strategy.

In a repeated game, deterring entry

If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output

In the ultimatum game, one reason players don't choose the rational offer is

In a dynamic game, rational players

In a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game

A an example of a game in which a leader moves first, and then the other rivals follow is a ________ game.

Introduction

Supply and Demand

Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis

Consumer Choice

Production

Costs

Firm Organization and Market Structure

Competitive Firms and Markets

Monopoly

Pricing With Market Power

Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition

Game Theory and Business Strategy

Managerial Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Asymmetric Information

Government and Business

Global Business

Filters

In an indefinitely repeated game, a firm might use a to a rival that defects from a cooperative strategy.