Exam 6: John Locke Free Agents

According to Locke, "freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference."

Taylor says, "In the first place, then, and most obviously, a state or event is logically impossible if the description of its occurrence is self-contradictory, like 'a ball's becoming square while still spheroid.'"

Sartre says, "When a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind-in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility." For Sartre, this defines the concept of ...

Spinoza says, "Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as 'man' to Peter and Paul." Do you think that Spinoza's analogy is strong or weak? Explain your answer.

What is Sartre's definition of "anguish"?

What is Sartre's definition of "abandonment"?

Taylor is critical of the position that says, "that 'I can' expresses the idea of a causal relationship in which a very special kind of mental event fills the role of the cause-namely, a certain kind of mental thrust or internal urging, well known to metaphysicians and philosophers of the mind as an act of will or a volition."

According to Locke, "a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent."

According to d'Holbach, "The faculties which are called intellectual, and those qualities which are styled moral, have been explained in a manner purely universally and ethically."

Explain what d'Holbach means when he says, "Man is said to deliberate, when the action of the will is suspended; this happens when two opposite motives act alternately upon him."

In the reading, when God says, "I will grant you a very, very special dispensation to sin as much as you like, and I give you my divine word of honor that I will never punish you for it in the least. Agreed?" To which the mortal responds that he would then be completely determined in his actions which is unacceptable."

d'Holbach says, "It has been believed that man was a free agent because he had a will with the power of choosing; but attention has not been paid to the fact that even his will is moved by causes independent of himself; is owing to that which is inherent in his own organization, or which belongs to the nature of the beings acting on him."

In the Spinoza reading we find the claim that "In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity."

Taylor criticizes the position that says, "if I am asked by the physician whether I can move my finger and I reply that I can, then what I am telling him, if 'can' here (as in the stone and egg case) expresses a hypothetical possibility, is that if there should occur within me a certain (unnamed) event or state, then the finger motion would at once follow as a ..."

As part of his discussion, Spinoza says, "The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought, therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions; in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative energy."

Explain what d'Holbach means when he asserts that "From all that has been advanced, it results, that in no one moment of his existence is man a free agent. He is not the architect of his own conformation, which he holds from nature; he has no control over his own ideas, or over the modification of his brain."

Foot says, "We hold responsible only a man who is a causal being; if someone were always to do things out of the blue, without having any reason to do them, we should be inclined to count him as a lunatic, one who could not be held responsible for his actions, so that even if he did things he would do things for which he could not be held responsible."

Foot says, "We have now considered two suggestions: (1) that an undetermined action would not be one which could properly be attributed to an agent as something that he ______ and (2) that an undetermined action would not be the action of a _________ agent."

In the reading, God says, "free will is not an 'extra'; it is part and parcel of the very essence of ..."

As part of his discussion, Spinoza says, "The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought, therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions; in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative ..."