Question 1

The ability to deter entry requires

Accepted Answer

A) a credible threat that if entry occurs the firm is willing to produce more than they would otherwise. 
B) a credible threat that if entry occurs the firm will not produce more than they would otherwise. 
C) a good lawyer. 
D) a clever accounting department. 
A) a credible threat that if entry occurs the firm is willing to produce more than they would otherwise. 
B) a credible threat that if entry occurs the firm will not produce more than they would otherwise. 
C) a good lawyer. 
D) a clever accounting department.

Question 2

If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output, the other firm does not view the announcement as credible because

Accepted Answer

A) the announcing firm's profits will fall if it carries out the threat. 
B) the other firm's profits will fall if the announcing firm carries out the threat. 
C) the other firm's profits will rise if the announcing firm carries out the threat. 
D) the other firm will double output also. 
A) the announcing firm's profits will fall if it carries out the threat. 
B) the other firm's profits will fall if the announcing firm carries out the threat. 
C) the other firm's profits will rise if the announcing firm carries out the threat. 
D) the other firm will double output also.

Question 3

In a repeated prisoners' dilemma game

Accepted Answer

A) the players act sequentially. 
B) the outcomes are the same as in a static prisoners' dilemma game. 
C) firms' choices are not influenced by their opponents' actions. 
D) cooperation may result if the game is played indefinitely. 
A) the players act sequentially. 
B) the outcomes are the same as in a static prisoners' dilemma game. 
C) firms' choices are not influenced by their opponents' actions. 
D) cooperation may result if the game is played indefinitely.

Question 4

In the beauty contest where players predict the outcome of players choosing a number between 0 and 100

Accepted Answer

A) the Nash equilibrium is 0. 
B) your prediction should be based on what you think the winning number will be. 
C) the Nash equilibrium is 33. 
D) there is no Nash equilibrium because people are not rational. 
A) the Nash equilibrium is 0. 
B) your prediction should be based on what you think the winning number will be. 
C) the Nash equilibrium is 33. 
D) there is no Nash equilibrium because people are not rational.

Question 5

Incumbents are unaffected by fixed costs of entry while potential entrants are affected by them because

Accepted Answer

A) for potential entrants the cost is avoidable, while for the incumbent, it is not. 
B) fixed costs will be greater for the potential entrant than for the incumbent. 
C) fixed costs are zero for the incumbent. 
D) incumbents will act to prevent entry at all costs. 
A) for potential entrants the cost is avoidable, while for the incumbent, it is not. 
B) fixed costs will be greater for the potential entrant than for the incumbent. 
C) fixed costs are zero for the incumbent. 
D) incumbents will act to prevent entry at all costs.

Question 6

In a tit-for-tat strategy, a player

Accepted Answer

A) randomly punishes its rival. 
B) ensures that the joint profit is maximized in each round. 
C) copies the action of its rival's prior move in the subsequent rounds. 
D) maximizes the joint profit in the game. 
A) randomly punishes its rival. 
B) ensures that the joint profit is maximized in each round. 
C) copies the action of its rival's prior move in the subsequent rounds. 
D) maximizes the joint profit in the game.

Question 7

The trench warfare case during World War I is an example of a(n)

Accepted Answer

A) tit-for-tat strategy. 
B) explicit agreement. 
C) non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
D) None of the above. 
A) tit-for-tat strategy. 
B) explicit agreement. 
C) non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
D) None of the above.

The ability to deter entry requires

If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output, the other firm does not view the announcement as credible because

In a repeated prisoners' dilemma game

In the beauty contest where players predict the outcome of players choosing a number between 0 and 100

Incumbents are unaffected by fixed costs of entry while potential entrants are affected by them because

In a tit-for-tat strategy, a player

The trench warfare case during World War I is an example of a(n)

Introduction

Supply and Demand

Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis

Consumer Choice

Production

Costs

Firm Organization and Market Structure

Competitive Firms and Markets

Monopoly

Pricing With Market Power

Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition

Game Theory and Business Strategy

Managerial Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Asymmetric Information

Government and Business

Global Business

Filters

Exam 13: Strategies Over Time

The ability to deter entry requires

If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output, the other firm does not view the announcement as credible because

In a repeated prisoners' dilemma game

In the beauty contest where players predict the outcome of players choosing a number between 0 and 100

Incumbents are unaffected by fixed costs of entry while potential entrants are affected by them because

In a tit-for-tat strategy, a player

The trench warfare case during World War I is an example of a(n)

Introduction

Supply and Demand

Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis

Consumer Choice

Production

Costs

Firm Organization and Market Structure

Competitive Firms and Markets

Monopoly

Pricing With Market Power

Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition

Game Theory and Business Strategy

Managerial Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Asymmetric Information

Government and Business

Global Business

Filters