Multiple Choice
We could define "physical" by saying that the physical world is composed of only one kind of basic particle. If there is a mental substance, as a substance dualist believes, it must be made of a different kind of stuff. Why does Montero think that this doesn't work as a definition of "physical"?
A) Physicalists don't believe in a mental substance or "ghost in the machine."
B) Physicists might discover that there is more than one kind of basic particle making up matter.
C) Few physicalists think that quarks and leptons are nonphysical.
D) All of the above.
Correct Answer:
Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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