Multiple Choice
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2.Based on this information the leader's reaction function is
A) r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2.
B) r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1.
C) Q1 = 49 - 0.5Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.5Q1.
D) The Stackelberg leader does not react to the output decision of its rival.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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